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Abstract 
The Chinese state and society are frequently engaged in an area of mutual concern: the 
increasing threat of climate change. The state is approaching this concern by directing China’s 
development towards a low-carbon economy, where the aim is to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions without limiting economic growth. Societal actors such as social organisations 
started emerging in China in the 1980s and are to a further extent than before interacting 
politically with state matters, climate change included. 
This thesis explores how societal actors, environmental non-governmental organisation 
(ENGOs), are interacting with state actors when addressing climate change mitigation issues. 
Through the two sub-variants of corporatism; societal corporatism and state corporatism, it 
will analyse whether or not the societal corporate mechanisms are challenging the state 
corporate mechanisms in the Chinese climate change and NGO politics. Furthermore, this 
thesis explores to what extent ENGOs are setting and pursuing their own climate change 
mitigating agendas and to what extent the state or other factors determine those agendas for 
them. Through the case study of two domestic climate change concerned ENGOs, China Civil 
Climate Action Network (C-CAN) and China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN), this 
thesis aims to elucidate what cases are on the ENGOs’ agendas and how they approach both 
state, each other and society through their work. 
This thesis draws the concluding remarks that state corporate mechanisms are still evident for 
social organisations’ expansion, legitimacy and credibility in China. However, the growth of 
societal corporate mechanism that target combating climate change is gaining a stronger 
foothold and withhold the ENGOs’ political interaction possibilities with state corporate 
mechanisms. The international climate change negotiations, the use of online media and 
private market mechanisms are signs of this growth. Furthermore, the state is inviting ENGOs 
to join climate change related collaboration projects, despite the various organisations’ 
registration statuses. This leads us to believe that the inclusion of the public in order to 
address the threat of climate change is a strategy prompted by the state to combat climate 
change. This thesis also observes that the ENGOs are balancing on the thin boarder between 
setting agendas that do not threaten the state’s authority and agendas that can echo and gain 
credibility within a less climate change concerned Chinese society. 
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1 Introduction 
Under China’s one-Party rule Chinese society is to a large extent controlled by the state. The 
state is, in numerous ways, involved in defining the grounds from which Chinese society 
develops and on what premises it takes shape. However, Chinese society is establishing itself 
under very different circumstances since economic reforms were introduced in the 1980s. 
This has resulted in an increase of social organisations (Saich, 2006, p.1). Consequently, the 
society is leaving heavier interest representational footprints in the interaction with the state 
than earlier.  
The Chinese state and society are frequently engaged in an area of mutual concern: the 
increasing threat of climate change. China’s world leading emission rates
1
 have left the 
country in a national and international political hot spot requiring it to address domestic 
climate change policies, preferably sooner rather than later. Social organisations share the 
state’s present concern for the need of emission rate reductions. They have become more 
aware of and alarmed by the devastating impacts of climate change. Chinese environmental 
non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) addressing climate change mitigation
2
 are 
relatively new and few in China. Since 2007, reducing the threat of climate change has been 
placed on the ENGOs’ agendas and treated as a matter of high priority (Schröder, 2011). This 
thesis seeks to display and explore how the interaction between ENGOs and the state unfolds 
when involved in a field that holds such high political priority and is so important for both 
parties. I address this topic with the following research question: 
To what extent are Chinese ENGOs setting and pursuing their own agendas related to climate 
change mitigation and to what extent does the Chinese state and other factors determine those 
agendas for them?  
My research question explores the agendas ENGOs
3
 develop based on what they believe is 
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the best strategy for fighting the threat of climate change in China. By “agendas” I mean the 
ENGOs’ areas of interests and how they incorporate these into their work strategies. This 
thesis also discusses other societal actors and the state’s own approach at handling the threat 
of climate change. Both parties, the state and the society, are preoccupied with a competitive 
concern; however their concerns do not enjoy mutual political power.  
It is vital and timely to analyse the role these new societal actors’ (ENGOs) play in the 
development of climate change policies. China’s climate change mitigation actions are 
usually discussed in the light of China’s performance on the international arena; however the 
significance of China’s domestic conditions should not be neglected but rather highlighted in 
present research. The thesis aims to emphasise, strengthen and contribute to the research done 
on the Chinese NGO sector, the role of Chinese domestic climate change actions and policy 
development.  
This thesis analyses how state and society interact, and further touches upon a vital 
connection between influence and restraint on the ENGOs agenda setting. That is why I have 
chosen to use the theory of “corporatism”
4
 as an approach to this topic. In short, corporatism 
can be explained as a framework for understanding tugs of war and negotiation between 
interest organisations and state agencies (Østerud, 2007, p. 79). The framework will help us 
understand how societal actors relate to the state actors when setting their agenda to be 
launched. It is exactly this relation between the two parties, which I find interesting to 
explore, however it is difficult to measure to what extent influence or discipline prevails 
between the two actors (Østerud, 2007, p. 78). Based on the corporatist theory I expect to 
make certain findings in this thesis. As a result of the economic reforms the ENGOs enjoy 
bigger political interaction possibilities, due to a larger extent of societal corporatist 
mechanisms. This development affects the interaction between the state and society in 
relation to climate change mitigation and for the ENGOs independent agenda setting 
opportunities.  
In order for me to approach such a vast and fragmented topic as state-society interaction, I 
have performed a case study of Chinese ENGOs concerned with climate change issues in 
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particular. This case study includes two domestic ENGOs primarily concerned with climate 
change: China Youth Climate Change Action Network (CYCAN) and China Civil Climate 
Action Network (C-CAN). The case study will help to illustrate how these ENGOs set their 
agendas, what activities are on their agendas and what state-society factors determine their 
role in the domestic climate change concern. The empirical data about the two organisations 
and the Chinese ENGO sector have been collected through fieldwork in China, where several 
interviews were conducted. Since this thesis only covers some of China’s many ENGOs 
working with climate change and represents just a small segment of the populous Chinese 
society, the answer to my research questions will emphasis the ENGOs’ own perspectives 
where my main target is to explore this field “through the eyes” of the ENGOs.  
This thesis suggests that ENGOs have recently been given more leeway for interest groups 
political interaction. The possibilities for political interaction by the ENGOs exist due to the 
increased extent of societal corporatist governance ENGOs possess under state corporatist 
mechanisms. This development has appeared mostly as a result of the economic reforms, 
which loosened the state’s grip over society and allowed more social organisations and other 
private actors to emerge. It has influenced the current between the state and society and 
eventuated in more actors being involved in the climate change negotiating process, such as 
the online use of media, international climate change negotiations and private market 
mechanisms. Additional explanatory factors for the increased political interactions between 
state and society are the climate change administration’s gained and expanded capacity to 
incorporate ENGOs´ interests, and the state’s political will to include the Chinese public to 
help reach the national emission reduction policies. Whether or not the incorporations of 
ENGOs is due to the need for public participation to solve the climate change threat or if it is 
due to their political significance is a difficult assumption to conclude with. Despite the larger 
extent of societal corporatism, the state corporatist mechanisms still confines the ENGOs 
from fully engaging in various climate change mitigation strategies and limits the ENGOs 
from acting upon agendas that yield political power. ENGOs’ organisational capacity deprives 
them the courage and possibilities to enforce their own agendas, which again hampers their 
position to act as credible actors both in the Chinese society and within the state.  
The rest of this thesis will be divided into three parts. In part one I will introduce the thesis’ 
background information. This information consists of chapter 2 where I present my 
methodological approach and chapter 3 where my theoretical framework, corporatism and its 
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variants: state corporatism and societal corporatism will be introduced. In Chapter 4 I will 
present the Chinese national climate change and NGO concerns and administrational agencies 
involved in determining the ENGOs legal existence and goals. Part two of this thesis, Chapter 
5, explores the ENGOs interaction with the state on climate change mitigation and legal 
issues. However most importantly it presents my findings from the case study I conducted on 
the two ENGOs: CYCAN and C-CAN. The thesis will then proceed to the third part, chapter 
6, where I will discuss and analyse my findings and engage in a further debate on the extent to 
which the ENGOs agenda setting power is determined under state corporatism and societal 
corporatism. It further discusses the ENGOs autonomy from and dependence on the state.  
This chapter will also highlight other problematic factors involved in the ENGOs 
determination and pursuit of their agendas such as capacity and credibility. Finally I will sum 
up my findings and conclude in chapter 7.  
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2 Method  
This chapter seeks to present the process of my data collection during the work on this thesis 
starting from January 2012. In order to answer my research question I have used text analysis 
and fieldwork as a method. My findings are based on text analyses of both primary and 
secondary sources. My primary sources are the published materials from CYCAN and C-
CAN, the information accessible on the organisations’ Internet home pages but also the 
conducted interviews with the organisations members. Most of my empirical material has 
been collected through fieldwork in China over a period of 6 weeks from March to April in 
2012. My secondary sources are comprised of international and Chinese scholars’ research; 
furthermore I have consulted Chinese state documents and state departments Internet home 
pages’ for information. All the translations of the various non-English sources used in this 
thesis are exclusively the authors, unless otherwise stated. 
2.1  Case Study and Fieldwork 
I have chosen to answer my research question by applying a case study as a method. By 
engaging in this case study on Chinese domestic ENGOs I examined the “hows” and “whys” 
of ENGOs specific climate change mitigation work and gained insight into their views on 
their own agendas, the state and the Chinese society. The thesis pursues how the Chinese 
ENGOs and the Chinese state approach climate change mitigation in China, as well as how 
the Chinese state approaches NGO actions. Case study as a method seeks to explain 
circumstances on “how” and “why” some social phenomena work and is further a good 
approach to use when examining contemporary and ongoing events (Yin, 2009, p. 4-7). There 
is not much existing research dedicated to the branch of ENGOs concerned with climate 
change, which made me choose to use fieldwork as a means to learn more about them. 
Moreover, the fieldwork, being a qualitative method emphasizes the importance of “the 
actor’s point of view” (Repstad, 2007, p. 19). Consulting fieldwork as a method has also been 
vital owing to limited primary sources on the ENGOs included in my case study. In addition 
to providing me with interviewees and material from the organisations, the fieldwork gave me 
the chance to join two separate climate change related seminars, one held by the ENGOs 
themselves and another held by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Due 
to the maintenance of CYCANs webpage (Cycan, 2012a), hence inaccessibility, during the 
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initial phase of the thesis the interviews with the members of the organisation and the material 
I picked up in its office in China, such as printed reports and policy papers published within 
China, have been of invaluable importance to my findings in the thesis. This has also been the 
case for my primary sources on C-CAN. Their home page (C-can, 2012c), which, as a result 
of underfunding is not up-to-date, made the information and written literature obtained during 
the interviews and visits to their offices, respectively, vital sources. Without the fieldwork the 
understanding of and findings on the two ENGOs would have been limited. 
Qualitative interviews were a natural choice of method when obtaining more in-depth 
knowledge of the ENGOs’ own point of view. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
five ENGO officials from six different ENGOs, together with a set of five informal interviews 
with people involved in various aspects of the Chinese NGO sector. I formally interviewed 
two members from CYCAN and two members from C-CAN in their offices. The interviews 
were conducted in English and Chinese. All my formal interviews were recorded in consent 
with the interviewee. I chose my formal interviewees according to the position they hold in 
the respective organisation and contacted them by e-mail for an interview request before 
arriving in China, while other interviews both the formal and informal ones have been a result 
of the snowball effect. Since I wanted to access information on agenda setting I chose to 
formally interview people in high and administrative positions as they are involved in the 
organisations strategic and formality work. To what extent the different organisations were 
interested in granting an interview varied significantly. I have used material from all the 
interviews in this thesis. I will explicitly state CYCAN or C-CAN when writing about 
information on the two organisations, as for information concerning all the other ENGOs I 
spoke to or ENGOs in general I will use ENGOs.  
2.2 Ethical Estimations and the Credibility of 
Sources 
China’s political system and the restraints on social organisations’ activities pose the risk of 
coming across ethical issues concerning sensitive state matters (Heimer and Thøgersen, 
2006). In order to protect my sources, information acquired during the interviews is not 
attributed to any individual. The interviews are referred to as “interview 1”, “interview 2” and 
so forth. The informal interviews will similarly be referred to as “informal interview 1”, 
“informal interview 2” and so forth. My thesis aims at presenting research on a small segment 
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of the societal actors moving about the Chinese domestic climate change arena. That is why I 
have excluded interviews with other state actors concerned with the matter. Consequently the 
representation of CYCAN and C-CAN in this thesis will result in specific in-depth research 
that will contribute to a more generalised view of the Chinese ENGOs that are concerned with 
climate change (Yin, 2009).   
The process of collecting data raises an inevitable question of the credibility of the sources. 
The use of both the ENGOs home pages and the interviews as sources has made me assess 
their credibility and reflect on the context in which the material was collected (Thaagard, 
2009, p. 179). As previously mentioned Chinese ENGOs do not have many publications 
issued outside of China nor are their pages kept up-to-date, which are the main reasons for 
choosing fieldwork as a method. The use of Internet as a trusted source in China is, in general, 
not unproblematic. In China Internet is used under specific conditions (Yang, 2003, p. 455). 
The caveats concerning Internet censorship must be taken into account when gathering the 
information you find there.  My other source, the information acquired during the interviews, 
is a double edged sword (Schostak, 2006). I cannot be certain that my interviewees give me 
“perfect information” that I can apply to this research. “With every view directed by a subject 
towards another there is an inter-view, a space between views” (Schostak, 2006, p. 22). In 
addition to personal perception and capacity regarding a research topic, interviewees can 
forget to mention aspects or the researcher can ask the wrong questions. Sensitivity issues or 
other hindrances might also have limited my interviewee’s space to grant me full access to 
their work (Yin, 2009; Shostak, 2006).  
The conflicting issues I have met during my research have been numerous and required 
decision-making based on space limitations, scope conditions and necessary generalisations 
of concepts. My goal in including fieldwork in this paper has been to obtain information about 
the case study, which is not offered outside of China. My main task throughout the case study 
has been to produce analytic generalisation and not particularisation (Yin, 2009). Some 
nuances encountered during the fieldwork and interviews might have been lost due to 
language issues, which possibly affect the credibility of this research (Yin, 2009). However I 
have kept all recordings from the interviews so they can be verified if necessary.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
 
In an authoritarian state, such as China, the state is often heavily involved with societal 
matters, and ENGOs are no exception (Xie, 2009, p. 3). It is important to understand and 
categorise the relationship between the ENGOs and the state. Corporatism is a useful 
framework for analysing this relationship. By using this theory I will highlight key elements 
of how state and society interact when dealing with issues of mutual interest; in this case, the 
threat of climate change. In this chapter I will first present corporatism followed by the 
differences between societal and state corporatism. I will also introduce the expected findings 
in this thesis based on the use of the corporatist theory. Additionally, this chapter includes a 
section wherein some of the advantages and disadvantages of using corporatism as a 
theoretical framework are presented. 
Before we continue I will briefly mention the use of the term “the state”. The Chinese state 
does not exist independently from persons or institutions since the state institutions do not 
function independently from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many scholars equate the 
state with the CCP. This is where the term “party-state” originates. The term denotes a state in 
which the CCP, as the core of the state, monopolizes state power (Zheng, 1997, p. 6-12). In 
this thesis, “the state” is referred to as defined by Zheng (1997). The same issue, the 
omnipresence of the CCP within state institutions, applies to the Chinese government.
5
  
3.1 Corporatism 
Corporatism is a structure that comprises the various dimensions in the negotiation process 
evolving between the state and society in a country (Østerud, 2007, p. 79). Traditionally, 
corporatism meant a political system with functional representation, where the political 
organs were composed of selected representatives from organisations, associations, labour 
organisations and businesses. A state with such a political system would be a corporative state 
(Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Corporatism is usually presented as a counterpoise to democratic 
pluralism and free market forces. However, corporatist mechanisms do not explain a political 
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system. The term can be applied both to a polity under communist rule and in democracies. Its 
generalising character is both an advantage and disadvantage, which we will take a closer 
look at under 3.3. Furthermore, the term has been associated with fascist governments during 
the 1930s, but in modern times, corporatism is used to describe different political 
arrangements under governments exercising various forms of governance (Østerud, 2007, p. 
77-79). As defined by Phillippe C. Schmitter, a frequently cited scholar, corporatism is: ”a 
system of interest representation in which the constituent parts are organized into a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
support” (Schmitter, 1979, p.13). In general, this theory is about correlating a country’s 
society and dividing it into corporate groups, in accordance with their common interests.  
3.1.1 State Corporatism and Societal Corporatism 
There are two subtypes of corporatism: state corporatism and societal corporatism
6
. The 
difference between the two lies in the relative strength and autonomy of social organisations 
in relation to the state. Under state corporatism, the power of the state is predominant (Lu, 
2009, p. 147). State corporatism is an authoritarian variant of corporatism. Policy making is 
based on a “top-down” governance model where the corporative institutions’ primary task is 
to discipline their members, especially within the trade unions and labour organisations. In 
state corporatism, the aim of the state is to be a tight organisation whose emphasis is placed 
on unity, discipline and cooperation (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Wherein the corporate institutions 
are tools used to control and conduct various societal sectors. The government may take 
charge of creating and maintaining the corporatist organisations and grant itself the power to 
assign or remove leaders at will (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 31). The state’s relation to NGOs 
in such an authoritarian variant of governance predominantly revolves around the degree to 
which the state can use the organisations to achieve better policy results or as implementation 
tools for political decisions (Alpermann, 2010 p. 125). In addition, NGOs under such “top–
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down” mechanisms are primarily used for gathering information on society (Salmenkari 
quoted in Alpermann, 2010, p. 125).
7
   
Societal corporatism means, in brief, a governance mechanism based on a diversity of 
volunteer organisations who serve as stakeholders in public advice mechanisms and 
resolution bodies (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). As well as a mechanism that recognises more 
“bottom-up” demands  (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 40). It is more or less a compromise 
between capital and labour forces and between the state and the market, which mandates the 
stakeholders to engage in mutual consultation with each other. Societal corporatism is not 
establishing itself as a part of an authoritarian decree, but rather develops through the 
participation of volunteers, which is driven by claims from the “bottom” or invitations from 
the “top”. Additionally it has emerged through connections and associations across the 
organisations (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Scholars have observed a development in China after the 
reform period in the direction of societal corporate mechanisms as playing a bigger role 
(Unger and Chan, 1995; Saich, 2011).
8
 As mentioned in the introduction, the economic 
reforms in the 1980s introduced market economy and as a result relaxed Party control over 
society (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 38). This development is seen as contrary to that of 
China’s neighbouring countries (South Korea and Japan) where corporatist mechanisms were 
introduced to strengthen the state’s grip on economic development, but for China it was a 
mechanism through which the state’s grip could be loosened (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 38). 
These tendencies for more liberal societal mechanisms in China will be further discussed 
throughout the thesis and matters a great deal for the Chinese ENGOs agenda setting and their 
relation to the state.  
 
Even though the two variants of corporatism are defined here, it is important to add that this 
separation is a very difficult task to conduct. To decide if, or in what way, the ENGOs are a 
part of the state organs, or vice versa, is in many ways precarious “Every corporative organ 
commutes between the influence of participation and discipline of the actors involved with 
great tension” (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Due to the fact that tension is difficult to measure, it is 
necessary to emphasise that research conducted on state-society relations, such as my own, 
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contains some opaque information.   
 
Harmony is a slogan for a corporatist system, regardless of whether the harmony is based on 
consensus (societal) or a “top-down” approach (state). This harmony is very often goal-
oriented towards serving a national mission. That is why corporatist solutions often apply to 
wartime regimes that stress rapid economic development coupled with the aim of enforcing 
political and social stability (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 30-32). The concept of social stability 
and the building of a harmonious society (hexie shehui) is in China’s case a policy objective 
that determines a lot of Chinese policy making and implementation practises, both nationally 
and internationally (Zheng and Tok, 2007). This political concern affects the Chinese ENGOs 
in several ways, though; especially in relation to the importance of social stability in China 
and further that growth of interest groups represent a threat to the state. 
Drawing on corporatism as an analytical framework, my expected finding throughout this 
thesis is that ENGOs agenda setting is less determined by “top-down” governed mechanisms 
and more by “bottom-up” mechanisms, which provide the ENGOs with increased possibilities 
for political interaction.  
3.2 The Variations and Limitations of Corporatism 
Corporatism could be criticized as being too general a framework for an analysis of the state 
and the society. When considering China’s Party-state system and consequently its impact on 
the establishment of entities outside state control, which have the potential to threaten the 
state’s legitimacy or credibility, a generalised state-society relations theory seems inadequate. 
Not only the complexity of the Chinese state apparatus is omitted from the corporatist theory, 
but also the complexity of the ENGOs themselves. Applying corporatism, one faces the 
challenge of having to treat social organisations as a homogenous group in order to analyse 
them (Fan, M., 2010). A multiplicity of ENGOs exists in China, which consequently 
stimulates further diversity of relationships with the state. In some cases the organisations 
operate in a “continuum stretching from a state-dominated extreme to a civil society extreme” 
(White quoted in Lu, 2009, p. 12).
9
 This aspect has been important to keep in mind when 
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exploring the differences and similarities between the two ENGOs in the case study.  
Referring to the definition of the term “state”, other theories that place more emphasis on the 
characteristics of the Chinese political system have been introduced in the analysis of state-
society relations in China. Many alternatives and interesting theories exist, which seek to 
explain China’s state-society relation using other premises than corporatism, such as 
“fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992), “state-in-society” (Migdal, 
2004), “civil society” (Yang, 2003; Deng, 2011) or “dependant autonomy” (Lu, 2009). 
Furthermore, corporatism does not fully embrace the complexity and fragmentation of both 
the state and society (Alpermann, 2010). It treats both entities as two separate units and by 
doing so creates both advantages and disadvantages when applying the theory as an analytic 
tool. Due to the disadvantages of excluding particularisation, other subdivisions or branches 
of the corporatist theory have emerged such as “The East Asian Model” (Unger and Chan, 
1995) or “Socialist Corporatism” (Pearson, 1997).  
The advantages of using corporatism lie in its ideal model and easy applicability when 
analysing the complexity of the interaction between the state and the society. When treating 
the state and society as two different political units the interaction between them is easier to 
categorise and notice. Schmitter (1979) also warns against a definition of corporatism that is 
so “narrowly attached to a single political culture, regime type or macrosocietal configuration 
that it becomes, at best, uniquely descriptive rather than comparatively analytic” (Schmitter, 
p. 8). Schmitter here emphasises the advantage of generalisation, which the corporatist theory 
offers. I believe this is also an advantage for this thesis when analysing and comparing the 
interaction between the state and the ENGOs’ agendas. However, when we further explore the 
state-society relation in China in this thesis we must be aware of the above mentioned 
weaknesses and benefits when using the corporatist approach. 
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4 The State Concern 
The purpose of this chapter is to include the overarching national climate change concern held 
by the Chinese state today. It emphasises the reason behind the increased attention climate 
change has been given over the last years. Additionally the chapter presents the different state 
actors in China’s climate change administration, their position and responsibility in the 
domestic climate change policy making
10
. Furthermore this chapter introduces how the state 
is administrating the NGO sector in China. 
4.1 The Climate Change Concern 
If we all agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the direct cause for climate change, then it 
is all too clear who should take the primary responsibility. 
–Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier December 
18 at the Conference of the Parties in 
Copenhagen, 2009  
 
The statement above displays the pressure China is under into taking responsibility for its 
emissions. For China, as for many other developing countries, the threat of climate change is 
a sensitive matter. In China’s case its sensitivity is embedded in an inter-linked three-
dimensional dilemma: fostering economic development, the need for energy and reducing the 
threat of climate change consequences (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 231-237). 
This dilemma acts as the backdrop, which determines and sets the framework for China’s 
policies and actions addressing climate change (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 
230). In 2008 the Chinese government officially recognised human activity as one of the 
reasons for GHG production (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2008) and due to the various impacts climate change has had on China, the 
Chinese government has admitted that China’s development is not sustainable and must head 
in a different direction than before (Gørild Heggelund quoted in Moe, 2011, p. 9). China has 
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therefore started to move its development towards building a low carbon economy
11
 (NHDR, 
2009/10).  
4.1.1 The National Targets and Climate Change Administration.  
The first element to be aware of is that of Chinese climate change policies, particularly its 
energy policy, which are strongly linked to the country’s economic policy and development. 
China’s main priority is economic growth (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 231). 
China’s development has led to improved conditions and standards of living for its citizens on 
a large scale, however this development has caused an enormous pressure on access to 
resources, degraded the environment and caused harmful air quality (Economy, 2003). 
Secondly, with economic growth comes energy demands. Energy security and expanded 
energy consumption is a critical tug of war for the country’s future economic development 
and is again linked to the economic obstacles that might arise when taking actions to secure 
sufficient energy for the population without emitting more CO2. Thirdly, the indication of 
increased vulnerability due to the threat of climate change and the consequences it threatens 
on the Chinese population has resulted in a growing concern in the Chinese government 
(Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010 p. 231-237). The reports of drought, floods and food 
security issues have been numerous the last couple of years (CCTV, 2012). In 2011, droughts 
destroyed grain that would have sufficed in feeding 60 million Chinese for a year (Climate 
Change Info, 2012). 
Some of the most recent and clear-cut evidence of the growing concern of the impacts of 
climate change is the climate change policy shift that took place between the 11
th
 (2006-2010) 
and the 12
th
 (2011-2015) Five Year Plan (FYP)
12
. To put it simply, the climate change policy 
shift between the two FYP’s has taken the shape from formerly not mentioning to presently 
including the issue of climate change in the country’s national economic and societal plans 
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(Moe, 2011). The aspect that is given most attention to in the policy shift from the 11
th
 to the 
12
th
 FYP is not only the political recognition climate change has been given as a topic that 
needs political action, but rather the change in targets set for energy and carbon intensity
13
 
(Seligsohn and Hsu, 2011).
14
   
What makes the targets in the 12
th
 FYP increasingly ambitious is that by having met last 
period’s targets, the succeeding targets set for this FYP will be even harder to meet. To have a 
rapid emission reduction over a short period of time gets increasingly harder the more you 
reduce. These initial reduction policies in the 11
th
 FYP are referred to as the “low-hanging 
fruit”- policies that are easiest to implement- (Seligshon and Hsu, 2011). Prohibiting coal 
plants and shutting down polluting factories are examples of easily implemented policies. 
Climate change policy analysts now believe that the necessary step in order to meet the 12
th
 
FYPs targets is the inclusion of the public (Zou Ji, 2012; Schröder, 2010, p. 6). The public 
participation (gong gong canyu) (Schröder, 2010, p. 6) will be discussed in both chapter 5 and 
chapter 6 as it is of relevance to the ENGOs. 
The awareness of the climate change issue, which led to a change within the climate change 
administration in the Chinese government, has been apparent (Heggelund, Andresen and 
Buan, 2010). I will briefly mention the trends that took place in the climate change 
administration from 2007 and onwards. The key institution in China’s domestic climate 
change policy making is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It 
manages the day-to-day business as the leading agency where it is responsible for organising 
and coordinating domestic decision-making and international negotiations (Central 
Government 2007a and 2008a quoted in Wübbeke, 2010, p. 4). The NDRC also has its own 
climate change department. The highest decision-making body of China’s climate-change 
policy is the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC). The group is, at the time 
of writing, led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Its roles are to coordinate policies, to define 
climate change and low carbon strategies across government agencies and to represent 
China’s national position in the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (Wübbeke, 2010, p. 3).  
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Climate change is not only a domestic matter, it is also considered a foreign policy matter 
(Moe, 2011; Interviews, 2012). This is due to the political process of climate change as 
administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in addition to the NDRC. This 
foreign policy link to climate change, as we shall see when we take a closer look at the 
ENGOs, is considered a crucial point on how to approach emission reductions exceeding 
national targets. The scope of climate change has new and wider boarders than before. This 
expansion has resulted in an administrational turn, which the climate change issue has taken. 
Furthermore the widening of the scope has also lead to a simultaneous expansion of 
sensitivity concerns. Being inter-woven with the economic administrational unit, NDRC, and 
the foreign affairs’ administrational unit, MOFA, climate change has a whole new range of 
negotiating forces contrary to when it was “perceived solely in scientific terms” (Heggelund, 
Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 237). On the other hand while the NDRC holds the 
administrative role of the climate change and economic policies, the country is now better 
equipped to work with, supervise and coordinate cross-sectoral challenges associated with 
climate change and to further incorporate it into China’s national development agenda (Lok-
Dessallien, 2010; Xinhua, 2011b, p. 12).
15
  
4.2 NGO Administration 
According to several scholars, NGOs occupy the space between the party-state on the one 
hand and the society at large on the other, which has only been made possible by the retreat of 
the state (See Alpermann, 2010; Unger and Chan, 1995; Xie, 2009; Saich, 2006). NGOs are 
more or less a product of the reform era when the arena for social organisations expanded. It 
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is further specified that the state is unwilling or unable to carry out the same range of 
functions and services as before, and that is the reason for the establishment of many social 
organisations (Saich, 2006, p. 285). This sub-chapter will take us through the significance of 
the state’s registration system for Chinese NGOs. The overall aim is for us to get a clear 
picture of one of the “top-down” mechanisms which dictates the existence of an NGO and 
which we can use as a backdrop when looking into the extent to which CYCAN and C-CAN 
can or cannot set their agendas independently.  
The concept and terminology of NGOs carries many meanings and definitions. One definition 
claims that NGOs are; “national and international nonprofit organisations as well as local 
membership organisations, often referred to as grassroots or community-based organisations, 
that represent the public interest (or the interests of groups of citizens) and are separate from 
the state and the market” (Biagini and Sagar, 2004). In this thesis I am referring to NGOs as 
social organisations formed by citizens that pursue common goals. The reason why I have 
chosen this definition are the ENGOs themselves who define their organisations as such 
(Interviews, 2012). The definition of an NGO is important both to me as a researcher but also 
to the organisation itself. It is tempting to place a subjective perception of what an NGO is 
and also what it “should” advocate and achieve in order for it to justify itself as a non-
governmental actor. My aim is therefore to look into how the ENGOs define themselves in 
order for us to get an “inside view” of their work. The NGO activity is in this thesis referred 
to as “bottom-up mechanisms by societal actors” (Alpermann, 2010, p.132). 
4.2.1 Registration Procedures and State Organs 
The state tolerated the vast emergence of NGOs in the 1980s. It is said that the regulations 
concerning proper registration and administration of social organisations took place after the 
students uprising in 1989 (Alpermann, 2010, p. 132). In China the term non-governmental 
organisation
16
 is widely used. The official term suggests that the notion of an NGO is ‘popular 
organisation’ (minjian zuzhi). Popular organisations contain three categories: 
1. ‘social organisation’ (shehui tuanti or shetuan);  
2. private non-enterprise unit (minban feiqiye danwei);  
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3. foundation (jijinhui) (Lu, 2009, p. 3). 
Social organisations are officially defined as “non-profit organisations which are formed 
voluntarily by Chinese citizens in order to realise the shared objectives of their members and 
which carry out activities according to their charters” (State Council 1998a quoted in Lu, 
2009, p. 3). Private non-enterprise units (PNEUs) are defined as non-profit social service 
organisations which are set up by enterprises, service units, social organisations, other social 
forces or individual citizens using non-state assets” (State Council 1998b quoted in Lu 
2009:3). Social organisations are membership organisations, but PNEUs are not. Foundations 
are defined as “non-profit legal entities that employ assets donated by actual persons, legal 
entities or other organisations for the purpose of engaging in public benefit activities”. Like 
PNEUs, foundations are non-member organisations. Any social organisation or PNEU must 
be approved and registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) at the county level or 
above, in order to exist lawfully. Foundations must be approved at the provincial or central 
government level. However, there are a few exceptions. The mass organisations (qunzhong 
tuanti) and people’s organisations (renmin tuanti) do not have to register. I will not go into 
detail regarding this kind of organisational category, but it can be mentioned that these 
organisations are more or less state agencies. They were created by the state and often hold 
administrative functions on its behalf (Lu, 2009, p. 3). Lastly, there are government-organised 
non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), which are, as the name states; NGOs, which are 
founded by the government. GONGOs tend to be elitist associations with close ties to state 
agencies and consist mainly of scholars, policy-makers and government officials. Due to these 
close ties they may be quite efficient (Heggelund, 2009, p. 162). Based on this description 
GONGOs seem to be moving in the wake of state corporatist mechanisms. Additionally many 
of the GONGOs were established as a result of bureaucratic downsizing, requiring the state to 
find new employment for former officials (Alpermann, 2010, p. 132). This thesis mainly 
looks into the situation of social organisations with an unofficial NGO registration status and 
discusses their relation to an officially registered NGO.  
Current regulations require that every officially registered NGO must have a professional 
management unit (yewu zhuguan danwei) to act as its sponsoring agency. After obtaining a 
sponsor an NGO can apply for registration at MOCA. In addition the sponsor must be a state 
organ above the county level, or an organisation authorised by such an organ. It must also be 
relevant to the activities proposed by the NGO - the sponsor must have the same 
responsibilities in the same field in which the NGO operates (also called “the dual 
19 
 
management system”) (Lu, 2009, p. 44). Nevertheless state agencies are under no obligation 
to accept applications for sponsorships from NGOs in their field. According to Lu (2009), 
current regulations also disallow NGOs with similar remits coexisting in the same 
geographical area. For example, in Beijing regulations state that a maximum of one NGO 
serving the Beijing football club Beijing Guoan, can officially be registered.  As a result of 
these rules, many NGOs have been unable to register either due to the lack of a sponsor or 
due to similarities to existing and registered organisations. Some NGOs, in order to exist 
legally, register as businesses with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC) and have received preferential attention by international donor agencies (Lu, 2009, p. 
4-5). Lastly, there are many NGOs that are unregistered and, hence, illegal organisations that 
carry out activities openly and have been left alone by the government. They are believed to 
exist because of the government’s limited capacity to enforce the NGO regulations. Further it 
is also claimed that the existence of many organisations with diverse legal statuses has 
contributed to the government’s failure to put the sector in good order (Lu, 2009, p. 4-5). 
Another reason for the disregard of unregistered organisations is their limited threat to the 
state or social stability. 
The registration procedures for NGOs in China are complex and a subject of frustration 
among the ENGOs I have talked to. Most of the ENGOs I was in contact with during the 
fieldwork called themselves social organisations (shetuan) because they identified with the 
State Council’s definition from 1998, however they are not registered at MOCA and are not 
member based (Interviews, 2012).  
What makes the presentation of the above mentioned legal framework interesting in regards 
to Chinese ENGOs is that these procedures are heavily influencing ENGOs’ actions. The 
ENGOs in my case study have familiarised themselves with the system and subsequently 
chosen a registration status which allows them to operate outside of the registration system, as 
either a business or a non-registered organisation. The ENGOs operate as NGOs but do not 
hold an official recognition as an NGO. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage for the 
ENGOs. The next chapter discusses this issue as well as displaying how CYCAN and C-CAN 
are approaching both their legal statuses and the threat of climate change.  
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5 The Societal Concern 
 
So far the last chapter has provided us with a backdrop on the state’s concern for climate 
change and most of the state agencies, which address the threat of climate change and interact 
with Chinese ENGOs. It has shown how the “top-down” governance mechanisms applied by 
the agencies involved with climate change and civil affairs are included in the various factors 
that determine Chinese ENGO’s leeway. For the rest of this thesis my research proceeds by 
exploring the social actors - the ENGOs - what their agendas look like and how they address 
climate change mitigation issues. 
 It should be noted that none of the two ENGOs have used the term “agenda setting” or 
“agenda”. Both interviewees and the material published by the organisations rather use 
“prospects/visions”(yuanjing), “projects”(xiangmu), “focus”(zhongdian) and “goals”(mubiao) 
when addressing their own climate change related interests or actions.(C-CAN, 2011; 
CYCAN, 2009; CANGO, 2010). As already mentioned in the introduction, the agenda is an 
agreement on the organisations’ interests where they emphasise working areas they think are 
best to follow when facing climate change problems. The term agenda is in other contexts 
used as a way to describe how NGOs, or other political actors for that matter, are becoming 
insider policy-making participants by setting complementary agendas for other (state or 
organisational) actors based on the NGO’s effort (Murphy, 2007, p. 2-3).  
5.1 The Case Study of CYCAN and C-CAN 
I chose CYCAN as an organisation for the case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is the 
first domestic climate change youth organisation established in China and, secondly, 
CYCANs agenda on climate change mitigation is directed towards public participation 
(gongzhong canyu) and raising awareness among the public (gongzhong de renwei) (CYCAN, 
2009; Interview 3, 2012; Interview 4, 2012). Thirdly, CYCAN’s work is mainly concerned 
with China’s next generation which, most likely, will face the consequences of climate 
change first hand in some way or another.  
What made me choose C-CAN was its status as a collaborative network for multiple climate 
change organisations in China and its emphasis on cooperation (lianhe xingddong) with 
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numerous state agencies and other actors to assess climate change mitigation issues (C-can, 
2012b). Moreover, it is a network that focuses primarily on climate change mitigation 
strategies. Finally, CYCAN is one of C-CANs network organisations. This links them closely 
to one another, which I find is an exciting combination. At first I suspected that this could 
make them less interesting due to a smaller chance of divergence, overlapping of work areas 
and promotion of identical positions and viewpoints. However, that assumption was proven 
wrong. Nevertheless, the two organisations’ striking similarities at first glance are in some 
aspects poles apart. What differs the most between the two ENGOs is their concerns when 
addressing climate change issues, which again are reflected in their agendas. CYCANs 
agendas target awareness-raising while C-CANs targets national climate change policy 
advocacy. It has been observed through my case study, that the two ENGOs have different 
registration status, aims, collaboration partners, donors, methods and motivations for 
conducting their work on climate change in China and, thereby, choose different approaches 
and, consequently, develop different agendas.
17
 
5.1.1 China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN) 
Our parents, their generation, are not aware of these issues…so it is our generation who 
should take action.  
-Fan Jie, Member of Beijing 
University Clean Development 
Mechanism club, in the Economist 
2010. 
CYCAN was established in 2007 and defines itself as a network consisting of 7 different 
ENGOs
18
 (CYCAN, 2009, p. 3; Interview 3, 2012). It is registered as a business at SAIC and 
is mainly sponsored by private donors. As a registered enterprise they need to pay an income 
tax rate of 5 % on all donations and they must renew their registration annually (Interview 5, 
2012). The organisation has around 30 unpaid members working both domestically and 
internationally and relies on most of its work to be done on a voluntary basis. CYCAN is one 
of the 16 member organisations in C-CAN (CYCAN, 2009, p. 3; C-can, 2012a; Interview 3, 
2012). 
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The organisation is engaged in various types of work and has currently four main activities on 
its agenda (Interview 3, 2012).
19
 Its main effort is the “Higher Education Institutions (HEI)” 
campaign (Zhongguo gaoxiao nenghao shuju diaoyan) which is a programme aimed at doing 
research on University campuses’ energy consumption, evaluating their energy consumption 
efficiency, scientifically supporting their energy conservation and emission reduction 
programmes. This campaign is known under the English slogan “Green Campus” (CYCAN, 
2009, p. 9-16). The target of this campaign is, in addition to lowering emissions, to establish a 
formalised management that can make the cooperation of the institutes, NGOs and the 
contract mechanisms with partners involved in the campaign easier. The establishment of 
China Energy Consumption Standards for HEIs is the main target of this campaign, which is 
scheduled to end in August 2012 (CYCAN, 2009, p. 10-15; Interview 3, 2012).  
CYCANs second main activity is focusing on sending a delegation of youth members to the 
next COP meeting
20
 to participate as observers in the negotiation process (Interview 3, 2012). 
The organisation’s third and most recent project is an exchange program for interns between 
CYCAN and an American climate change organisation whereby its emphasis is put on mutual 
learning and capacity building. This programme is sponsored by a foreign donor and was 
launched the summer of 2012. The fourth and last activity is the preparations for the 
International Youth Summit on Energy and Climate Change (IYSECC)
21
 (guoji qingnian 
nengyuan yu qihou bianhua fenghui) held the summer of 2012 (Interview 3, 2012). At the 
time I was interviewing CYCAN, the organisation was about to start preparing for IYSECC 
and the COP delegation, so there is not much information about this yet. CYCAN has 
participated at the IYSECC before (IYSECC, 2010, p. 21; IYSECC, 2012). 
The organisation’s declaration (CYCAN, 2009) emphasises its desire to take on a broad range 
of actions related to climate change issues such as public education, research and campus-
greening projects (CYCAN, 2009). By the end of 2012 they hope to reduce GHG emissions 
on Chinese university campuses by 20%. Furthermore, CYCAN mentioned that all their 
actions put much emphasis on and are based on scientific principles. They also encourage 
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public participation and cooperation with the government, corporations, local communities 
and other social organisations (CYCAN, 2009; Interview 3, 2012; Interview 4, 2012). The 
declaration is emphasising various actions to address climate change mitigation, however 
CYCANs main agenda is raising awareness among Chinese youth regarding climate change 
issues and sustainable lifestyle choices. This point was especially made during the interviews 
with the organisation as well. 
When asked what CYCAN’s most essential work is, an interviewee said, “I think it is to 
educate the Chinese youth on skills and competence so they can discuss climate change issues 
and engage in that field. I personally cherish this growth much more than the actual solving of 
the climate change issues” (Interview 3, 2012). Following up on this statement I further asked 
why it is so important that the Chinese youth develop in this sense. Interestingly the reply was 
very similar to several other ENGOs’ replies on the importance of development for ENGOs in 
China. Most of them said; “Chinese do not yet have the ‘capacity’ to take on this kind of topic 
and need to develop that before they do any other kind of development” (Interviews, 2012). 
This point was explained through the example of when CYCAN participated at COP 15
22
. 
The CYCAN interviewee witnessed how the international media listened to international 
NGOs when they announced their views to journalists. “These circumstances were not the 
case for the Chinese NGOs. The Chinese NGOs did not get this kind of recognition from the 
Chinese media” (Interview 3, 2012). The interesting aspect here is that the interviewee 
emphasised that the Chinese NGOs are not equipped or educated enough to promote their 
case in the media. However, there might be other reasons for the Chinese ENGOs not 
reaching the ears of the Chinese media. COP 15 was a critical negotiation process for China 
and can potentially be one of the reasons for this. 
CYCAN is active on the social networking arena. They have 7 social networking accounts; 
Weibo, Facebook, QQ, Renren, Douban, Linked-In and Youku
23
 (Cycan, 2012a). After 
months of maintenance starting from February 2012 their home page was up and running 
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again in April 2012. The new layout of this home page is more upgraded than the one they 
took offline in February, yet it does not offer an English translation of the page’s content as 
the previous site did (Cycan, 2012a). CYCANs online activity has been noticeably different 
after their new web page was launched in April. They post relevant material and update their 
social networking accounts frequently. It will be very interesting to follow this activity and 
revisit their progress in future research projects since this extent of online activity is a 
relatively new move for CYCAN and not included in this analysis to a great extent.      
To sum up the general specifics of this ENGO, CYCAN is a social organisation, defined as a 
non-profit organisation based on voluntary participation and registered as a business at SAIC. 
CYCANs focus is on raising awareness, education of organisational skills and promotion of 
climate change issues to Chinese youth, especially University students. They also emphasise 
the importance of conducting qualitative research, which can be useful to the state. They keep 
a low profile in regards to advocating national climate change policies and place limited 
importance on participation in international climate change negotiations. By being a member 
of C-CAN they get invited to meetings initiated by C-CAN with the NDRC and other climate 
change actors. CYCAN further describes its membership in C-CAN as a good way to 
communicate with other ENGOs and to spread its own agenda. Apart from that the link to C-
CAN was not further highlighted by CYCAN (Interview 3, 2012). When asked about the 
concern for their registration status, CYCAN claimed that they do not want to be registered as 
an official ENGO for the purpose of avoiding any potential limits being imposed on their 
activities by the government when running campaigns (Interview 3, 2012).  
5.1.2 China Civil Climate Action Network (C-CAN) 
C-CAN is a non-registered network. The organisation has 16 member organisations, however, 
several other organisations are in the process of applying for membership
24
 (CCAN, 2011; c-
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can 2012b; Interview 1). The organisation wants to promote and facilitate information sharing 
and joint action (lianhe liliang) at various levels with the goal of forming a wider coalition of 
stakeholders to address climate change. C-CAN also communicates and cooperates with 
Climate Action Network International (I-CAN) as an independent Chinese network on the 
international arena. According to my interviewees at C-CAN, the only limitations on 
membership in C-CAN are on GONGOs and student groups. The reason for this selectiveness 
is that GONGOs are too closely linked to the government and the student groups’ activities 
are not considered “NGO actions” (Interview 1, 2012). C-CAN’s member organisations are 
domestic officially and non-officially registered NGOs, which are all based in China. In 
addition, C-CAN also consists of non-member observer organisations. The observer 
organisations
25
 attend C-CANs annual meeting and propose suggestions for the development 
of C-CAN (Interview 2, 2012). 
C-CANs main interest on their agenda is to “strengthen the knowledge base and capacity of 
NGOs to work on climate change science, policy and public involvement; to participate in 
international NGO discussion forums on climate change topics; to improve the understanding 
of policy processes and participation in decision making; and to improve the capacity of 
NGOs for joint cooperation” (CCAN, 2011). C-CAN’s home page claims that they “will 
continue to facilitate internal discussions among NGOs, external dialogue with the 
government and to campaign on climate legislation” (C-can, 2012b).  C-CANs agenda and 
work is divided into two sections; the policy group and the campaign group. The policy group 
was set up in 2011 and is a platform for discussing and learning about national climate change 
policy (Interview 2, 2012). Its main focus is placed on communicating with the member 
NGOs, being a mediator for the Chinese people, providing policy recommendations to the 
state and making national climate change policies more transparent and effective (Interview 2, 
2012).  
The campaign group have four points on their agenda for the coming future; however I have 
chosen only three of them. The first one is the “Green commuting fund” (lüse chuxing) which 
is supporting activities for low-carbon commuting in cooperation with China Association for 
                                                                                                                                                   
!
=V!D$,!25(,*K,*!2*6'&%('.%2&(!9.<)*B:)#,<)*<!'*,`!D(%&6$)'!/&%K,*(%.Q^#fH!_,(,'*J$!'&-!f,K,32+7,&.!
#,&.*,E!#3,'&!T%*!M&%.%'.%K,!T(%'!#,&.*,!9#TM^T(%'<E!PY\TH!;2&6!k2&6E!11\E!:*,,&+,'J,E!/0!
O&K%*2&7,&.E!;,%&*%J$!ao33!\2)&-'.%2&E!M&.,*&'.%2&'3!/&%2&!82*!#2&(,*K'.%2&!28!@'.)*,E!D$,!T(%'!
\2)&-'.%2&E!D$,!#3%7'.,!:*2)+E!D$,!@'.)*,!#2&(,*K'&JQE!@'.)*'3!_,(2)*J,(!'&-!f,8,&J,!#2)&J%3!!9#^J'&!
=>"=5X!M&.,*K%,A!"E!=>"=<G!!!
26 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations Cooperation (CANGO) (CCAN, 2011). Their second 
campaign is the “Exchange Programme with European ENGOs”, which was launched in 
order for participating ENGOs to learn about capacity building across borders. Thirdly, C-
CAN has initiated the C+ initiative (C+shidian), which is a campaign that advocates people 
from various locations and industries to adopt a more ambitious emissions reduction target 
than the legally-binding targets set by the government (Interview 1 and 2, 2012; C-can, 
2012d). Beyond their webpage, C-CAN has a Weibo account, which is frequently updated and 
has 5903 followers, as of the time of writing (Weibo, 2012a). Just like in CYCAN’s case, I do 
not have the space to elaborate on C-CANs Weibo activity in this thesis, but their online 
activity would be interesting to follow in future research.
26
  
Going back to the registration status of C-CAN, the organisation is a project of the officially 
registered NGO, CANGO (Interview 1, 2012). CANGO was founded in 1992. It is a non-
profit NGO, officially registered with MOCA in 1993, operates nationwide and is rated as one 
of the top 500 NGOs in China in 2011 (C-can, 2012a; CANGO, 2010). CANGO focuses on 
promoting “China’s civil society development and providing a platform for the exchange of 
experiences and information for Chinese NGOs” (CANGO, 2010, prefix). C-CANs secretariat 
has been based at CANGOs’ headquarters since 2008 and is not registered in CANGO. As 
seen in chapter 4, where the different types of NGOs have been introduced, the status non-
registered network is not a category. The link C-CAN, as a non-registered organisation, has to 
CANGO is interesting. It is seen as a very crucial position due to the favourable relations 
CANGO has to state organs. Further it is an interesting aspect that an officially registered 
NGO is able to openly work with a non-registered NGO. All the funding C-CAN receives, 
goes through the secretariat at CANGO before being forwarded to C-CAN. C-CAN can never 
partner in a project due to their status as a non- registered network so their donations go 
through CANGO (Interview 1, 2012). Private, foreign sponsors mainly fund C-CAN. The 
majority of CANGOs primary funding comes from the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP), however according to the interviewees at C-CAN, that funding is limited (Interview 1, 
2012). The financial benefits for CANGO to collaborate with C-CAN are, based on these 
findings, preferential. 
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In March 2011 it was announced that the Chinese government was going to launch an open 
process for a new piece of climate change legislation – a national Climate Change Law. C-
CANs member ENGOs prepared a submission through several workshops where they 
reviewed the existing environmental laws and defined unified demands regarding the Climate 
Change Law. During this process the ENGOs also met with the responsible official from the 
NDRCs Climate Change Department where they got updates from the government’s side 
concerning the climate change law (qihou bianhua lifa jiaoliu hui) (C-can, 2012e). C-CANs 
policy group put all the different parts of the submission together and forwarded it to the 
wider ENGO group for feedback. The final version was sent to the NDRC (Interview 2, 
2012). The submission’s content included guiding principles, the preferred structure of the 
legislation, mitigation and adaptation approaches proposals, institutional settings, innovation, 
finance and public awareness, as important points to the ENGOs. Most of all it highlighted 
the need for effectiveness, equity and transparency in the Chinese mitigation policies 
(Interview 2, 2012). Whether or not the submission is being taken into consideration in the 
drafting of the legislation is not yet known. 
To sum up, C-CAN’s role as the organiser and provider of a communication platform for 
national member ENGOs is paramount. This effort facilitates a “joint society” in 
communication with the government. The platform gives each individual organisation a voice 
and acts as a meeting point for the organisations where information can be shared and spread. 
C-CANs main agenda is both to strengthen ENGO’s capacities and to do policy advocacy so 
the Chinese climate change policies can become more transparent. In addition, the close 
relation to CANGO also grants a non-registered NGO direct access to collaborate with state 
organs. As observed, both C-CAN and CANGOs agendas express almost similar interests.  
5.1.3 The Two ENGOs Compared 
Both the organisations, presented above, are non-profit organisations and are both primarily 
concerned with climate change. Neither CYCAN nor C-CAN are official NGOs and C-CAN 
also holds the status as non-registered. Both organisations apply the term NGO to their work, 
as the organisations were formed voluntarily by Chinese citizens, in order to realise shared 
objectives and to carry out activities according to their programmes (Interview 1, 2, 3 and 5, 
2012). Their agendas share the aim of contributing to climate change policies by conducting 
useful and professional research that can be of use to the government. In addition they both 
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emphasise the importance of capacity building in order for them to stand firmer in interaction 
situations, with each other and the government. The two ENGOs place importance on 
exchange and learning from foreign ENGOs. 
 
Internet activity and use of social media is also something both the ENGOs want to improve. 
However they feel they lack staff capacity to maintain this kind of online activity, since the 
process requires ongoing engagement, updating and frequent renewals to gain a credible 
foothold among their followers (Interviews, 2012). However, CYCAN is to a larger extent 
than C-CAN concerned with online activity. Since CYCAN is emphasizing reaching out to 
the young Chinese, this extent of online activity is a vital strategy to reach its wanted 
followers.  
 
CYCAN encourages public participation and runs climate change awareness-raising 
programmes while C-CAN holds a more formal position, focusing on influencing policy and 
cooperating with the government. C-CAN is also an important focal point for the different 
organisations to communicate with each other and as an information provider. C-CAN is 
occupied with establishing governmental contact persons, facilitating meeting points and 
erecting a communicative platform for both the ENGOs and the government, which I 
perceived during the interviews as being more important than the actual policy advocacy. 
CYCAN, on the other hand, is more concerned with equipping the Chinese youth with tools 
to use when addressing the issue of climate change, and further getting the youth involved in 
organisational work. In most of the ENGOs I talked to, all their staff members are relatively 
young, this is also the situation in C-CAN and CYCAN. Taking the relative “freshness” of 
climate change work by Chinese ENGOs it should not come as such a surprise that the 
members are young. My impression is that both organisations are composed of engaged 
young people who want to make a change, either by reducing the threat of climate change or 
by contributing to Chinese society or both. C-CAN and CYCAN both stressed the Chinese 
government’s need for ENGOs’ contributions in its work to achieve the climate change 
targets set for the future (Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 5, 2012). 
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6 ENGOs’ Agenda Setting Power 
 
NGOs perform like a bridge connecting ordinary people and the government for that 
[sustainable development] goal.  
Xie Zhenhua, in China Daily, 2010. 
In this chapter I will discuss the ENGOs’ agenda setting power using the corporatist theory 
presented in chapter 3. I will explore how the ENGOs are influenced by state corporate 
mechanisms or societal corporatist mechanisms. Further I will discuss my assumptions where 
I expect that the ENGOs have gained increased political interaction possibilities due to 
societal corporate mechanisms playing a bigger role today (Unger and Chan, 1995). More 
importantly, I will include the ENGOs’ own experiences and views on their interaction with 
both mechanisms and extract what they believe are the biggest challenges they face when 
setting an agenda. 
Firstly, I will analyze how the power of the state is dominating the ENGOs using state 
corporatism as an analytic approach. I will discuss how the ENGOs’ dependence on the state 
guides their target on their agendas. Secondly, I will analyze the ENGOs’ agenda setting 
power under the influence of societal corporate mechanisms. I have chosen three societal 
corporate mechanisms, or factors, that are involved in the negotiation process that is evolving 
between the state and the ENGOs, hence the international climate change negotiations, the 
role of media, online activity and online newspaper, and financial donors. Thirdly, I will 
discuss other influential factors that determine the ENGOs’ agenda setting which are mostly 
factors emphasized by the ENGOs themselves, hence the ENGOs’ capacity and credibility in 
their own ranks, in the Chinese society and in the state.  
6.1 Agenda Setting Power under State Corporatism 
Pearson (1994) says: “Under state corporatism, the state deliberately restricts the number and 
multiplicity of associations, officially decree their legitimacy and protects their monopoly, 
centralizes the organisations and imposes controls on leadership selection interest 
articulation” (1994, p. 32). If and how the state is consciously imposing on the ENGOs and 
thereby their agendas is something I shall discuss in this sub-chapter. We will explore how 
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”top-down” governance in the name of reducing climate change and maintaining social 
stability is in the interest of the state and is thereby controlled by it.  
The state agencies described in chapter 4 which are involved with climate change policies and 
NGO policies are: NDRC, MOFA, NLGCC, MOCA, SAIC and MEP. I will discuss the 
authoritarian and disciplinary position these agencies have in relation to the ENGOs in the 
sections below. 
6.1.1 The Power of ENGOs’ Climate Change Agendas 
Despite the NLGCC being the main forum for the climate change concern and that it is the 
highest-ranking agency for climate change policy making in this regard, I will focus more on 
the role of NDRC in this section. NDRC is the agency that handles the daily affairs of climate 
change that is the most in contact with the Chinese ENGOs, especially since the latter part of 
2011 (Schröder, 2011, p. 20). The increased interaction between the NDRC and the ENGOs is 
due to various reasons. One of the reasons has already been discussed in chapter 4 where we 
have seen that the climate change administration has gained expanded capacity to deal with 
the issue, but also with cross-sectorial matters concerning the state (Lok-Dessalien, 2010). 
However, as seen in the presentation of CYCAN and C-CAN in the previous chapter, another 
reason is that NDRC discusses ENGOs’ agendas, as for example seen through the climate 
change legislation proposal cooperation project. 
Using the state corporatist approach, this increased interaction with NDRC can be another 
method for the state’s access to the society in order to improve policies or function as a 
control mechanism over a societal sector (Østerud, 2007). The close link with NDRC is an 
implication of how the state is potentially using its connection with the ENGOs to “bridge the 
gap between the society and the state” (Xie, 2010). This “bridging” is a beneficial position for 
the state that can be used several ways. The connection between state and society can serve as 
a platform for the state where it can gather useful information about society in regards to 
climate change mitigation efforts, campaigns, and problems, just to name a few. By the help 
from the organisations the state can access information about society they wouldn’t be able to 
access without them. By gaining access through a collaborating platform where the ENGOs 
are represented, such as for example what CANGO does through C-CAN, the state can use 
the ENGOs as a means to achieve better climate change policy results (Alpermann, 2010). By 
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engaging the “opposition”, the ENGOs, the state is not only involved in the control over it but 
also potentially maintains control on how the opposition operates. 
As seen during the case study, C-CAN and CYCANs agendas are not pushing for stricter 
domestic targets or policies than those already set. In this way the ENGOs relieve the 
government from inside pressure and higher emission reduction demands. One example of 
this is CYCANs HEI campaign that is aiming at reducing emissions at university campuses by 
20% within 2012. This target is more or less in synch with the national overall target in the 
11
th
 FYP where the reduction of carbon emissions was aiming for a 20% reduction by 2012 
(Xinhua, 2006). In C-CANs case the C+ initiative is also a campaign closely linked to 
national emission reduction targets, but C-CANs focus is to challenge the emitting 
participants to voluntarily reduce even more than what the state requires. By encountering the 
participants in the C+ and HEI campaign they do not put any pressure on the state to set 
higher emission reduction targets. This trend where the ENGOs are not demanding 
improvement of the national policies can be perceived as the ENGOs agenda are dominated 
by the state corporate mechanisms and are disciplined to only following national goals.   
Another state agency that is heavily involved in the design of national climate change policies 
is MOFA. It is closely linked to the international climate change negotiations that China is a 
part of. The concern for climate change commutes between two crucial arenas which makes it 
a political sensitive area to be engaged in both for the ENGOs and the state: the link from 
domestic demands to the international demands. The sensitivity has mostly to do with how 
every claim made on reducing emissions or improving national mitigation policies within 
China is also of relevance to China’s actions and targets on the international arena (Interview 
1, 2012). If Chinese ENGOs’ agendas were emphasising implementing campaigns where 
higher emissions reduction were requested it would consequently lead to an increased 
pressure on the Chinese state to take on more responsibility on a global scale.
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 In this matter, 
“…it is only logical that the corporatist state organs intrude and discipline the organisations 
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frequently and is more on its guard towards their ‘bottom-up’ character displeasuring the 
state” (Lu, 2009, p. 43-45).  
When asking the question what differentiates ENGOs work on climate change from other 
types of ENGO work in my interviews, one of the answers was the international dimensions 
of climate change as a topic. One interviewee explained this difference by suggesting that 
environmental protection in China is a less sensitive topic than climate change since 
environmental issues are easily something that can be portrayed as a local problem instead of 
an international one. To clarify this difference the interviewee gave me an example: If a 
factory is caught dumping wastewater in rivers the case can be “covered up” as an individual 
owner or a business is disclaiming responsibility or lacking morals. The problem is in the first 
place limited to concern the local area where the actual dumping is taking place. However, if 
a factory whose emissions are high end up contributing to increase the national emission rates 
of CO2 it is not only a local problem, but it is also bringing China on the international arena 
into trouble (Interview 1, 2012). Due to climate change holding a crucial position as both a 
domestic and an international issue, granting the ENGOs full autonomy where the risk of the 
ENGOs’ agendas demands more action from the state, might put unwanted pressure on China 
on the international arena. As seen through the example CYCAN gave me from their 
participation in COP 15 where they were not heard in the Chinese media, this aspect leads us 
closer to the assumption of state control over societal actors.  
To sum up, the corporate mechanisms discussed here; NDRC, MOFA in addition to NLGCC, 
might first and foremost influence the ENGOs’ agenda setting because they are China’s 
climate change policy makers and negotiators which can be perceived as guiding policies for 
the organisations’ own targets. When analysing the relation between the state and the ENGOs 
through a state corporatist frame, these two agencies are seen as “disciplining” the ENGOs to 
serve China’s national mission-reducing the threat of climate change according to national 
policy. Due to the ENGOs’ agendas fulfilling the national target of 20% emission reduction 
and the avoidance of further international pressure on national policy, there is reason to 
believe that the state is heavily involved in determining the ENGOs’ climate change 
mitigation agendas. 
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6.1.2 The Power of the ENGOs’ Growth and Expansion Agendas 
The state organs we have met in this thesis that are restraining and granting the ENGOs’ 
growth and expansion is MOCA and SAIC. MOCAs involvement with the ENGOs seems to 
be the state agency that is the most crucial for the ENGOs’ official and formal status. MOCA 
is the state organ that grants the ENGOs’ official NGO registration and this agency is heavily 
involved in determining which category the ENGOs belong to and consequently their 
dependence or autonomy from the state. Further, the SAIC agency also determines the 
ENGOs existence because they control the mechanisms where respective businesses must 
register in order to exist leagally as a non-profit organisation . However, SAIC does not grant 
NGOs that register an official NGO status, they open up for other climate change actors 
through the business registration procedures.  
How the registration system restrains growth and expansion interests on the ENGOs’ agendas 
is for example seen in the restrictions set on international leeway for ENGOs. An interviewee 
pointed out how the official NGO registration is fundamental for an NGO to take part in the 
international climate change negotiation meetings. For the ENGOs the participation in the 
negotiation meeting in UNFCCC requires an official document provided by the state in the 
respective country the NGO is registered in, in order to get the permission to participate. 
Since it is prohibited to have more than one official NGO doing climate change related work 
this official document is not available for the Chinese ENGOs interviewed. However, there is 
another way for the Chinese ENGOs to participate in the international negotiations and that is 
by signing up Chinese participants from the non-official registered organisation as an 
individual member in an international organisation that holds a formal NGO status in another 
country. This means that neither CYCAN nor C-CAN can travel to the UNFCCC and be 
represented as an organisation, but only as individual members as a part of another officially 
registered NGO (Interview 5, 2012). Furthermore, the United Nations (UN) that organise the 
UNFCCC conference is obliged to enforce these rules as a necessity of an official registration 
permit, or else they would not only be working against the Chinese law but also the rules set 
by UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2012b). This example of the official NGO registration permit 
pictures the role MOCA holds for the ENGOs’ international climate change engagement. 
However, one of the ENGOs interviewed was very upset by this international representation 
“lockout”. Others did not view this as specifically problematic since they got to send 
individual members together with partner organisations instead.   
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The last state corporation involved with ENGOs in this thesis is MEP. I have included MEP 
since it is the acting professional management unit for CANGO, who again provide the funds 
for its members, C-CAN and further CYCAN (Interview 1, 2012). Funding issues for ENGOs 
will be discussed under “6.2 agenda setting under societal corporatism” since the case study 
in this thesis covers two non-officially registered ENGOs who retrieve most of their funding 
from outside the state mechanisms. 
The restrictive methods on policy development and registration procedures presented above 
can be categorized as “attempts to create a state corporatist system of interest representation 
that helps co-opt societal actors into the organisational fold of the party state” (Alpermann, 
2010, p. 131). This is an essential point often emphasized by authors proposing a state 
corporatist model to explain NGOs in China. Considering this point Alpermann is making, it 
is possible to suggest that the strong link C-CAN has to CANGO can also be seen as a way 
for the state to intrude all the climate change related ENGOs in China. By cooperating with 
C-CAN, CANGO also has access to C-CANs financial donors and member organisations. 
Based on this assumption, the question if CANGO is potentially serving as a GONGO 
emerges. According to Heggelund (2004), GONGOs are state agencies and consist mainly of 
scholars, policy-makers and government officials and are very closely linked to the state. 
However, to judge where the line between an officially registered NGO and a GONGO goes, 
is not easy to tell. Additionally, it is even more difficult to evaluate this link especially when 
having excluded who CANGOs employees are, from this research. This assumtption can not 
be proven correct nor incorrect, however, when taking C-CANs existance on the primises of 
CANGOs registration status, it gives us reasons to believe that C-CAN is one step closer to 
state corporate organs than CYCAN. On the other hand, an unregistered organisations close 
interaction with state organs can also indicate the importance of the ENGOs themselves. 
6.2 Autonomous or Dependent Agendas? 
When discussing agenda setting it is highly relevant to discuss what Østerud (2007) describes 
as a difficult task regarding separation and tension between the two variants of corporatism, 
namely the commuting between influence and discipline of the actors (2007, p. 77). Even 
though the task is difficult, addressing the ENGOs’ autonomy from the state and dependence 
on it is vital for our further understanding of the relation between the two entities (Lu, 2009). 
“Many scholars believe that Chinese NGOs lack autonomy” (Lu, 2009, p. 29). This 
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assumption is most likely based on the rigid registration system for NGOs. As described 
above, the ENGOs cannot exist legally unless they are registered in MOCA, SAIC or as in C-
CANs case, through an officially registered NGO.  
Autonomy can be defined as “self-governing” or “independence” but it holds various 
meanings according to what discipline it belongs to (“Autonomy”, 2012). It is implied that 
autonomy is equated with “self-governing possibilities”. The expectation that NGOs are more 
genuine non-governmental and more autonomous and closer to the “grassroots” is often an 
unconscious expectation incorporated in the debate on Chinese NGO activity. This 
expectation has also been a challenge for me carrying out this research. NGOs’ autonomy 
usually stand in relation to their political circumstances. The political circumstance in a party-
state is quite different than in a democracy. “Bottom-up” mechanisms are more likely to be 
welcomed and incorporated in a democratic state. Based on this the road from linking 
autonomy as a necessity in order for an NGO to be a political influential organisation is short.  
When autonomy is limited, the “top-down” mechanisms are more involved. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that lack of autonomy forces the ENGOs to set another agenda than 
their own. A question that arises is how ENGOs under state corporatism are shaping a self-
governing agenda, hence an autonomous agenda setting? Does the lack of autonomy naturally 
imply that the ENGOs’ agendas and activities are more linked to the government policies for 
climate change mitigation? This dependency when setting a climate change mitigation agenda 
that challenges the national agenda has been suggested in the sub-chapter above. It has been 
noted in this thesis and in previous research that the climate change-concerned ENGOs’ 
agendas are set in compliance with national policy and follow the large climate change policy 
lines rather than pushing for their own interests (Stensdal, 2009, p. 61). What has been 
observed by researchers concerning the lack of autonomy for NGOs and seen under the case 
study is here confirmed. However, it can be argued that autonomy can be achieved by 
working with the existing political system in China, which is what most Chinese NGOs do 
and it leaves them in the eyes of international NGOs less non-governmental (Xie, 2009; 
Interview 4, 2012).  
Being dependent on the state or being less autonomous from it also results in some 
organisations faring much better than others in terms of mobilizing public support or 
achieving organisational stability. Here, the lack of autonomy and NGO performance is 
related. The question of performance, hence capacity and credibility will be discussed under 
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section 6.3 as it is of crucial matter to CYCAN and C-CAN in how they conduct campaigns 
and as one of the biggest reason for their agendas placing such a large emphasis on capacity 
building. Nonetheless, Lu (2009) notices in her research on Chinese NGOs that officially 
registered NGOs have more capacity and credibility to conduct successful campaigns in 
China. The funding from the state and the legitimacy the NGOs receive as a partly state 
corporate organ strengthens the credibility and gives them a position that makes them more 
successful in society (Lu, 2009). Being aware of the benefits of cooperation with the state can 
be seen as a clear incentive for obtaining close relations to state agencies in order for the 
ENGOs to conduct their campaigns. One may say that “dependence” on the state is also a 
well-perceived strategy used by the ENGOs. C-CANs strong link to CANGO is not 
completely a potential “top-down” approach as implied above, but also a “bottom-up” 
approach, because C-CAN experiences that cooperation with the state is more efficient when 
doing campaigns (Informal interview 4, 2012). Lu states that NGOs gain political legitimacy 
by showing that they accept the existing political order and conform state ideology. The type 
of legitimacy is also crucial to the survival of an NGO in China (Lu, 2009, p. 21-22). 
However, it should not be forgotten that some NGOs also relinquish autonomy in order for 
the organisation to better promote the interests of its members (Lu, 2009, p. 47). In CYCANs 
case, dependence on the state is a less wanted position to be in because it potentially limits the 
goals of their campaign. For CYCAN, they hold a low-key strategy to prevent interference 
from the state, but C-CAN place importance on collaborating with it.  
Revisiting Lu’s (2009) research where she is referring to close ties between the state and the 
organisations in China she claims that “just because a NGO is launched by a government 
agency, with government resources, that does not mean it will not find ways to pursue its own 
agenda” (Lu, 2009, p. 30). Even if using government resources this is not the case in this 
thesis, where we analyse non-officially registered NGOs, Lu’s aspect is interesting to keep in 
mind. Registration category of an ENGO can be determining for its autonomy. As signalled in 
the interviews, the organisations are interacting with the state because they find it beneficial. 
However, the interacting with the state is more in favour of C-CAN than CYCAN. 
The legal framework for NGOs puts them in the position where they must cooperate with the 
state if not the option is to perform as an illegal NGO. There are methods being used by 
organisations to gain more autonomy as networking and financial independence. Many 
officially registered NGOs are overcoming the constraints on their autonomy by using 
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personal relations, achieving financial independence, finding powerful patrons and offering 
their supervisory agencies benefits in exchange for more freedom. This is also the case for 
non-officially registered NGOs as well, where C-CAN is a good example. (Lu, 2009, p. 43). 
By overcoming these various constraints the organisations are not working in opposition to 
the state but on the contrary are connected with it through various ties (Alpermann, 2010, p. 
125). It can bee seen as a way of leading leaders to become better leaders. 
As seen above, the question of autonomy from and dependence on the state is vital for an 
ENGOs existence in China as well as for the ENGOs own identity, strategies and campaigns. 
The influence and discipline commuting between the ENGOs and the state has already been 
stated a difficult task (Østerud, 2007). What makes the commuting between the two 
interesting are the strategies and approaches used by the ENGOs in order for them to exist in 
the political landscape they must relate to. We will in the next section discuss the emergence 
of societal corporatist mechanisms in China, see how the ENGOs pursuit and take advantage 
of the more “bottom-up” mechanisms and further uses these when following their own 
interests. 
6.3 Agenda Setting Power under Societal 
Corporatism 
Societal corporatism is a political arrangement based on interest organisations interacting with 
state mechanisms (“korporativ pluralisme”, 2012). The emergence of societal corporatism in 
China after the economic reforms is a fact noted by many scholars. It is due to these trends 
one can assume that ENGOs possess more interaction possibilities and enjoy a higher extent 
of agenda setting power.  
The ENGOs’ agenda setting power is not only determined by the Chinese state. In this thesis, 
built on other scholars’ research of the emergence of societal corporatism, I have chosen to 
explore how the international climate change negotiations, the online media and financial 
donors are a part of this emergence. These factors are just a few of many noticeable factors of 
societal corporatism. There are other interest groups, which are relevant for research 
conducted on interaction with the Chinese state on climate change mitigation issues. 
Intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, and research associations, such as the 
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NCSC, should also be included in this section on the emergence of societal corporatism, 
however, these factors will not be included in this thesis due to space constraints.
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6.3.1 International Climate Change Negotiations 
We have already examined the international climate change negotiations and the obstacles the 
international dimensions impose to the ENGOs when working on domestic climate change 
issues. However, one very important factor, which is belived to connect the international 
climate change negotiations as a factor that enhance the scope of the ENGOs agenda setting, 
is the pressure these negotiations impose on the Chinese state. This pressure is interacting 
with the state both when it comes to the development and implementing of climate change 
policies in addition to being a factor that gives the ENGOs backup and leeway when 
promoting their own climate change agendas. The ENGOs, to various extents, want to 
participate in the international negotiations to both contribute to and learn from them. Despite 
the obstacles of climate change being a sensitive topic for China, the international 
negotiations of climate change causes external pressure on the Chinese state that China has 
been willing to accept parts of e.g. the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In this 
manner the international negotiations are already putting pressure on the Chinese state to take 
action. This is an advantage for the ENGOs when they communicate their interests to the 
Chinese state.  
When being introduced to this slogan under an interview: “Chinese first, global citizen 
second” (The Economist, 2010; Interview 5), it was noted that a comparable attitude existing 
in the various ENGOs interviewed in relation to the international climate change negotiations. 
Neither of the two organisations want to put their own state in the crossfire internationally and 
neither do their agendas emphasise this. It is not seen as profitable nor a wanted agenda for 
the ENGOs to make their own state “lose face” on the international arena (Interview 5, 2012). 
The interviewee’s statement is emphasising a prioritization of nationality and was mentioned 
as an important attitude in the interviewee’s organisation hold. There is a gratitude for being a 
part of the great development China has had during the recent decades, thus how this has 
given them so many benefits in life. Putting the state to shame for emitting so much CO2 
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while enjoying the fruits of the development that produced all the emission is considered 
conflicting by the ENGOs (Interview 5, 2012). I believe this is a genuine wish for the 
ENGOs, even though it is also a way of circumventing sensitive political topics, the three-
dimensional dilemma discussed in chapter 4. 
6.3.2 The Use of Media Online 
Some ENGOs are using the media more actively to communicate their cases and to shape 
public opinion (Schröder, 2011, p. 11). With media I am referring to online Chinese 
newspapers and social media. Both CYCAN and C-CAN have their own home page and 
Weibo account. CYCAN is also active on additional social media accounts. However, these 
two organisations are not yet using these Internet platforms to a large extent. Both 
organisations said in the interviews that they wanted to put more effort into online activity 
when they could find the capacity to do so (Interviews 1, 2 and 3, 2012). So far, their 
messages are spread through the meeting platform in C-CAN and on both organisations’ 
home pages.  
The media in China is not exclusively a mouthpiece for the government anymore (Zhan, 
2011, p. 155). That is one of the reasons why I chose to categorise the use of media as a part 
of societal corporatism. Richerzhagen and Scholtz (2007), in their discussion paper on 
China’s capacities for mitigating climate change, claim that the media is a vital mediating 
factor in the state-society relation in China (2007, p. 21). How the Chinese media plays a role 
in the climate change issue in China is important to discuss in relation to the topic of this 
thesis; to what extent the Chinese ENGOs can set their own agenda and to what extent other 
factors and the state determines this for them. Media in China is obliged to develop close 
links with state corporate organs in order for them to maintain their ability to work 
(Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2007, p. 21). This is, as we have seen under the discussion of 
autonomy and dependence a way for an interest group to exist within the framework they 
operate in. However, the alliance between the media and societal actors is taking place and is 
a possible way to exert influence (Zhan, 2011, p. 115).  
Boyce (2009) claims that the release of the climate change report in December 2006 initiated 
the media’s focus on the issue in China (Boyce, 2009, p. 160). At that time, most of the 
media’s coverage consisted of translated, scientific reports or scientific news from the West 
on global warming, often cited matter-of-factly. In addition, few articles were linking the 
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Chinese CO2 levels with the growing climate change problem (Tolan and Nan, 2007). The 
reason for this is most likely two sided. On the one side, climate change is a new topic that 
gained political recognition as a cause of concern as late as the 12
th
 FYP and thereby received 
little focus in the media. On the other side, Chinese media is more or less state run and by that 
the government controls its content to a certain extent, consequently this also applies to 
climate change related media coverage. News production in China still operates in an 
authoritarian political system, in which the political leadership aims to guide and control both 
the media and public opinion (International Media Support, February 2010). The Chinese 
media in general has developed significantly as a result of ideological and socio-economic 
changes. These include: commercialization; globalization; the rising consciousness of media’s 
social and cultural responsibilities in Chinese public discourse (International Media Support, 
2010). The “spaces” that have opened up for journalists reporting on the environment and 
climate change has widened due to the above mentioned reasons, however, the characteristics 
of climate change and environmental protection can only be assessed through public 
awareness and information (International Media Support, 2010). The media is a powerful tool 
for spreading a “green message” (International Media Support, 2012) and is further a useful 
tool for implementing campaigns by both the state’s and ENGOs’ agendas.  
In recent times the opening up of the Chinese media and the Weibo activity by Chinese 
netizens, has gained immense attention in relation to the various political situations taking 
place in China before the coming reshuffling of the Party’s Politburo in October this year 
(Rønneberg, 2012). How the media, especially Weibo, can be a channel for the interest groups 
used for the same purpose as the state corporate organs do, was demonstrated by a meeting 
with a Chinese climate change activist who is not a member of C-CAN or CYCAN (Informal 
interview 3, 2012). I met the activist at a workshop I attended during my fieldwork and was 
told that the activist’s ENGO had used an online newspaper to emphasise the ENGO’s ideas 
and project to further achieve credibility among the civilians in the town where they were 
initiating a campaign. The campaign’s goal was to increase the maintenance of bicycle lanes 
to improve the conditions for bikers in the city. The activist believed that by improving the 
bicycle lanes more people would use bikes as transportation around the city instead of fossil 
fuel driven vehicles. By increasing the number of bikers, the emissions from the 
transportation sector would decrease resulting in an improvement of the air quality in the city 
due to the reduced CO2 emission from transportation. To promote the ENGO’s campaign, 
photographs were taken of places where improvement for bicycle transportation had to be 
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done. For example, pictures were taken of concrete blocks in bicycle lanes that were lacking 
logistical solutions for transportation possibilities and posted on Weibo. The campaign was 
also contributed to by several activists riding their bikes around the city, placing notes on the 
windscreens of cars that were parked in bicycle lanes, informing the drivers of the 
complications and dangers their vehicles posed for cyclists. The activist’s campaign was 
successful insofar as it managed to prompt the local government to improve the conditions of 
bicycle lanes in the city. What gained more attention in this campaign was how the ENGO 
had managed to get the government’s attention by also writing articles about the campaign in 
the local newspaper that resulted in an replying article from the government within days. This 
negotiation process between the ENGO and the local government of the city was in retrospect 
praised by the local government for its persistence and successful ending (Informal interview 
3, 2012).  
The campaign was also noted by other attendees at the workshop this story was told at, due to 
its communicative achievement resulting in the ENGO’s voices being heard by the 
government in the end. However, it was quietly noted by one of the attendees that this process 
and campaign would not be possible in a bigger city. The attendee said the reason for this was 
the insignificance of such a case where the competition between urgent emission reduction 
priorities and less urgent ones is of dimensional difference. The success story from one 
ENGO in a bigger city in China can cause a domino effect that leads to many more and be 
considered a potential threat to China’s social stability, however, this aspect was not 
commented on by the workshop attendees. The type of successful media action seen in this 
example has not been the case for CYCAN or C-CAN, however it was repeatedly mentioned 
how the media holds the key for all the ENGOs to spread the message both within and outside 
of China (Interviews, 2012).
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Some ENGOs that were interviewed believe the media portrayal of China in the West to be 
incorrect and that they shed a light on China that is very negative (Interview 3 and 5, 2012). 
In this context it is considered an important task for ENGOs to mediate both domestic and 
abroad what the actual situation is through the media (Interview 3, 2012). This position, 
siding and strengthening its nation’s position in the international media was counterbalanced 
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in another interview. One interviewee made a point of the importance for ENGOs to voice 
their own ideas in the media and use it as a tool to empower the Chinese ENGOs, 
furthermore, to spread their message and thereby influence the government (Interview 5, 
2012).  
Media is to a larger extent portraying “bottom-up” wishes from the ENGOs, which grants the 
ENGOs greater interaction possibilities than without this mechanism. But on the other hand it 
should not be forgotten that the use of media is also favourable for the Chinese government as 
a communicative and implementing tool. In C-CANs and CYCANs case media is a more of a 
potential place to portray the organisations interests and agendas. 
6.3.3 Financial Donors 
Some would argue that financial donors have just as much of a say for the ENGOs’ autonomy 
as the involvement from state organs (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Financial donors move in 
between both state and society (Richerzhangen and Scholz, 2007). Financial donors are, just 
like the international climate change negotiations and the mediating power of the media, 
interest groups that are a result of more societal mechanisms in China. Financial donors are 
one part of the Chinese society and are therefore discussed in this analysis. It is interesting to 
observe how the donors are engaging with the organisations, the Chinese society and the state. 
It would also be very interesting to look into the background of the financial donors, who they 
are, how the donors choose the receiving organisations, how much money they donate and if 
there are certain conditions attached to the donations for the receiving organisations. 
However, this is a different topic that this thesis does not cover. 
30
 Nevertheless, non-
officially registered ENGOs cannot exist without financial means allocated outside the state. 
This financial support is especially important when it comes to employment capacity and 
campaigning activities for the ENGOs.  
All ENGOs I was in contact with during my fieldwork underscored the amount of capacity 
and time fund raising is consuming. Since the non-official ENGOs are not granted funding 
from any state agency they are dependent on financial donors to exist. Many of the financial 
donors are foreign companies, governments and organisations. Gaining private donor deals is 
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a way the social organisations work “outside the system” and diminishes their financial 
dependence on the state (Lu, 2009). Financial means can provide the organisations with a 
financial autonomy that enables them to act upon their agendas.  
In one of the interviews it was mentioned that the non-official ENGOs see a rapid reshuffling 
of employees due to the low salaries an employment in the ENGOs provide. The low salaries 
are a result of limited means to spend on administrative positions which leads to bulk 
personnel reshuffling within the ENGOs (Interview 5, 2012). The high rate of young 
employees in the ENGOs might be due to the economic uncertainty of working in the 
organisations grant. The reshuffling is not only a problem for the communication between the 
Chinese ENGOs but also for the communication with the state. When the reshuffling is 
frequent, the ENGOs are also difficult to relate to for state actors (Interview 5, 2012). This 
comment was made by an ENGO member, not CYCAN nor C-CAN. How the organisations 
are emphasising on having good contact with state actors in powerful departments or 
organisations are seen as crucial to have a ”voice” inside the state corporative organs. This 
part was also emphasized by C-CAN (Interview 1 and 2, 2012), hence C-CANs close 
relationship with CANGO. This aspect is interesting when seen in relation to previous 
research conducted on ENGO activity in China where the assumption that the patron-client 
mechanisms still plays a central role in China today has been suggested (Xie, 2009; Lu, 
2009).  
A recent development has been taken note of by Chinese ENGOs of a tendency for 
international donor agencies to favour less developed countries, such as African countries, for 
donations. This trend is believed to be driven by African countries comparatively smaller 
financial capacity to support domestic NGO activity. In the case of CYCAN, they depend on 
donations either from donors or that the members pay the costs with their own financial 
means in order for them to send a delegation to the next COP meeting. This is only one 
example, however it shows how important financial donors are for the organisations. When it 
comes to funding activity for participating in international negotiation arenas, the UN can 
only fund officially registered NGOs in order for the donation to be legal in China (Informal 
interview 1, 2012).  
China’s development has held a high speed and the country currently holds the status of a 
middle-income country (Word Bank, 2012). International expectations of an emerging class 
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of philanthropists
31
 (cishan)
32
 seems like a logical conclusion to that advancement (Interview 
5, 2012; Informal interview 2, 2012). It has been noted that there is an external pressure on 
Chinese companies with increasing financial means to act upon the responsibilities of being 
“better off” and financially support local NGO activity (Interview 5, 2012).  
The trend where international donor agencies prioritize countries with less financial means 
than China has also been noted in the state. One of the achievements CANGO obtained during 
2010 was getting the right qualifications to provide tax deductions of public good and relief 
projects, with a special emphasis on domestic donor institutions (CANGO, 2010 p. 6). This 
achievement is believed to stimulate more Chinese enterprises to donate money to the 
Chinese NGO sector. CANGO being an officially registered NGO has by this campaign 
focused on an increasing problem for the ENGOs that work outside the state organs. By that 
CANGO is negotiating on the NGOs’ behalf’s, suggesting that CANGO is not only being 
state corporate mechanism as prompted above, but also a societal actor helping the non-
official organisations to gain financial means.  
The main point of the inclusion of financial donors in the discussion of societal corporate 
mechanisms is that the non-officially registered NGOs are dependent on financial means 
retrieved from outside the state. There has been a change in donation activity towards Chinese 
NGOs which has made it harder for the NGOs to allocate funding. The financial donors are of 
importance to the ENGO’s employment and campaign capacity, but also for their existence. If 
the financial support stops it can be considered more threatening to the existence of an ENGO 
than actual state intervention of the organisation.   
6.3.4 The Invitation From the “Top”- Inclusion of the Public 
The national concern for climate change started emerging in the last couple of years and the 
state has realised that something must be done for China to meet its emission reduction 
targets. Some believe that in order for China to do that they need to include the Chinese 
people and not only set internationally oriented policy targets (Zou Ji, 2012). Under my 
fieldwork I got the chance to join a seminar held by the UNDP on climate change. This 
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seminar focused precisely on the importance of public participation in order for the 
government to succeed in meeting its FYP targets. The speaker at this seminar, deputy 
director of the NCSC, Professor Zou Ji, commented not only on the importance of improving 
national climate change policies but also on making an effort to analyse consumer patterns 
and looking into influencing young people’s lifestyles for the sake of reaching government 
targets (Zou Ji, 2012).  
The most related evidence to this will of inclusion is that several state documents are 
emphasising the need for public participation as a part of solving the climate change crisis 
(Xinhua 2011b, chapter 4; Dong, 2010; Xie, 2009, p. 30).“Incorporating public and voluntary 
groups in environmental policy-making has been emphasized by central government in a serie 
of documents and regulations” (Xie, 2009, p. 30). In section four of the White Paper
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(Baipishu) on climate change issued before the Durban high level meeting in 2011 
“participation of the whole society” (Xinhua, 2011b, chapter 4), is highlighted. The White 
Paper claims that: “China proactively publicizes relevant scientific knowledge in addressing 
climate change, enhances public awareness of low-carbon development, gives full play to the 
initiatives of non-governmental organisations, the media and other outlets, and uses various 
channels and measures to guide the whole society to participate in actions addressing climate 
change” (Xinhua, 2011 b, chapter 4). This quote is the government’s attempt to describe the 
relation between climate change and public awareness as well as emphasising how media, 
organisations and other channels are working together with the government. The rest of the 
White Paper’s section four concerns the media, public participation, government guidance 
and proactive actions by non-governmental organisations. Due to the strong evidence for how 
the state is limiting the “full play to the initiatives of non-governmental organisations” 
throughout the thesis, the White Papers notion of public participation can be questioned 
(Xinhua, 2011 b, chapter 4). However, I would like to once again revisit Østeruds definition 
of societal corporatism that highlights how an invitation from the “top” is an indicator of 
societal corporatism.  
It should also be mentioned that there exist fractions within the state based on the preference 
of inclusion or exclusion of ENGOs in state matters. According to my interviewees, one side 
viewed ENGOs as important for the interest representation of the Chinese people and also the 
importance to include the Chinese people in climate change mitigation. On the other side 
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there are other fractions in the state that do not recognise the benefits of interest groups and 
further view the NGO sector as a threat to the state and to a harmonious development of the 
society (Interview 1; interview 2, 2012; Unger and Chan, 1995). NGO work is still 
controversial (Interview 1, 2012). In this sense I believe the “bridge” Xie Zhenhua is referring 
to in the quote that this chapter initially started out with will be where the ENGOs are playing 
a vital role. As seen after a meeting between the NGOs and the government in 2011 
(Schröder, 2011, p. 20) Xie Zhenhua, deputy director of NDRC, said that within the recent 
years he has noticed how NGOs have arranged many "interesting and active" events on 
environmental protection and climate change which help to build an environmentally-friendly 
and resource-saving society (Dong, 2010). Xie Zhenhua further emphasized at the same 
meeting that the development of China in a sustainable way requires participation of everyone 
in the process of mitigating greenhouse gases and improving energy efficiency. Xie also 
welcomes NGO suggestions and advice for the government (Dong, 2010). The deputy 
director of the NDRC is one of the more positive state officials to the inclusion of ENGO 
work when approaching the problems of climate change. If his successor will have the same 
positive attitude towards the incorporation of ENGOs is unknown, however one member in C-
CAN believed that this attitude would stay in NDRC even if the leadership is reshuffled due 
to the significance of the work ENGOs are doing for both the state and the society (Interview 
2, 2012). Since the vast majority of the public is not overly concerned about climate change, 
the importance of ENGOs is even bigger (Schröder, 2011, p. 4).  
Whether or not the invitation from the “top” would have been the case if the ENGOs were 
working on an even more sensitive topic like for example human rights, there is reason to 
believe that the will of including interest groups in the state would have been dimmed. The 
ENGOs’ agenda setting under societal corporatism would not have been that clear. The 
dependence on the society to meet the climate change policies might have stimulated a 
political will for the ENGOs participation. It should not be neglected that the emergence of 
ENGOs is also a strong indicator for a growing concern amongst the Chinese people, which 
has lead some to organise themselves as ENGOs to address the climate change problem 
(Schröder, 2011).  
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6.4 Capacity and Credibility on the Agenda 
When capacity is achieved, then we can influence policies! 
-Interview 5, 2012 
Both CYCAN and C-CAN viewed capacity building as a matter of priority and a central point 
on their agendas in order for their work to spread and be approved (Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
2012). Scholars (Xie, 2009; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2007) have noticed this lack of 
organisational capacity in Chinese ENGOs and consider them weak in previous research. This 
weakness is seen in three areas. Firstly, there exist a small number of informal organisations, 
secondly, their resources and capacities are limited and thirdly, they have a narrow spectrum 
of strategies and approaches to combat their working areas (Xie, 2009). Lack of 
organisational capacity is something that influences credibility not only in the state but also in 
the Chinese society. The attitude towards NGO work does not gain much recognition for the 
time being (Interview 1; informal interview 4, 2012).  
During my fieldwork one interviewee shared an experience based on the lack of credibility 
when volunteering in a mitigation campaign for an ENGO. The organisation had invited 
Chinese schools to participate in a climate change poster competition where pupils were 
supposed to draw posters using climate change as a topic for the motives on the poster. When 
the ENGO launched its campaign at the various schools most participant schools required to 
see an official document approving that the campaign was initiated by the state. They further 
inquired whether or not the schools were allowed to join this campaign by the state (Informal 
interview 4, 2012). This was consequential for the success of this ENGO’s campaign. An 
educated guess, based on finding throughout this thesis, is that by cooperating with the state 
or a state agency, the outcome of this ENGO’s campaign might have been more successful. 
Capacity building is not only about financial means as one of my interviewees in CYCAN 
pointed out (Interview 3, 2012). There are three sides of capacity. One is the financial, 
discussed above; the other is the quality of the action for which an organisation is specially 
fitted (“Capacity”, 2012). The third point is that the ENGOs capacity is reduced due to the 
legal framework of NGOs limiting their capacity scope. These sides of capacity are important 
to CYCAN and C-CAN and are intertwined with credibility. CYCAN and C-CAN were both 
emphasizing that they wanted to hand over research and reports to the state about civil 
responses to climate change and further visualizing the organisations own agendas. However, 
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the ENGOs do not think the quality levels of their work are high enough to reach the ears of 
the state organs. This is an indicator that the organisations recognise that knowledge, 
education and credibility are factors that are influential for the pursuit of their own agenda. 
This aspect might be one reason for why they have chosen to collaborate closely with each 
other and by unifying and professionalising their voices they will increase their capacity to be 
heard. The ENGOs are networking because funding for climate change issues has been 
perceived as an area where only limited funding is available and this puts the ENGOs in a 
competitive relationship with each other (Schröder, 2011, p. 8).  
Another element of capacity is language. When conducting exclusively domestic ENGO work 
the need for another language is not necessary, however the international dimension of 
climate change brings about the necessity of understanding and using a high level of English. 
This aspect was an unexpected finding I made through the fieldwork. When I asked what my 
interviewees reckoned is the biggest challenges for an ENGO doing work on climate change 
in China today, they mentioned the high level of English climate change work requires 
(Interviews, 2012). Since climate change is an international issue the need for Chinese 
ENGOs to use English is a fact that excludes certain actors from the scene of ENGO work on 
climate change (Interviews, 2012). Some persons that want to work with the topic do not have 
the required English level to do so. When ENGO participants do not have a sufficient level of 
English, their participation in international delegations where the communication requires 
good English skills, normally results in the participants being excluded from the delegation 
(Interview 3; 4; 5; 2012).  
6.4.1 Summary 
We see that ENGOs in China exist within limits defined by the state and the state can both 
enable and impede their development. Chinese ENGOs may be characterised as existing at a 
transitional level between complete dependence on the state and having some degree of 
autonomy from it (Whiting, 1991, p. 43). Some Chinese ENGOs are organised around 
government-defined objectives and are perceived to lack the full autonomy, as believe to be 
the case of the close collaboration between CANGO and C-CAN. We have explored how the 
ENGOs’ agendas are restrained and incorporated in the state where they presumably are used 
as “tools” in order for the state to achieve better policy results but also to control the ENGOs’ 
pressure on the state. The “top down” governance seen through the registration procedures for 
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NGOs, when looking into how the ENGOs’ agendas are, are not challenging national climate 
change targets. The analysis signals that the state actors control, unify and conduct the 
societal sectors in this way.   
At the same time, both CYCAN and C-CAN, represent and present a societal concern for a 
topic that also concerns the state. They are in many ways mediating an increasing concern in 
the Chinese society to the state. It is seen through the analysis that societal actors, ENGOs, 
concerned with the threat of climate change, have been given more leeway in recent years. 
Signs of the inclusion of the international climate change negotiations, also including and of 
interest to the ENGOs, is of support to the ENGOs’ interests. The expansion of online media, 
especially social media activity and online newspapers is a venue where the ENGOs want to 
and are spreading their agendas. Further, the financial donors could not have entered the 
Chinese market if it weren’t for economic reforms. However, their role is dual. Donors both 
facilitate and challenge the ENGOs’ political interaction possibilities. Financial donors are a 
sign of increasing societal corporate mechanisms and are enabling the ENGOs with financial 
donations, however if the donations are withdrawn it has consequences for the existence of 
the ENGOs. Finally, the societal corporate mechanisms is seen in the political will of 
including the public, hence “bottom-up” demands, in assessing climate change. There are 
reasons to believe that the ENGOs are stakeholders that serve in public advice mechanisms 
(such as C-CANs organisations contributing to the Climate Change Legislation or the 
environmental activist winning a case through civil action). That the ENGOs are unifying 
themselves through C-CAN is a sign of a connection and association across the organisations 
and an indicative of societal corporate mechanisms. This networking approach is, presented 
by the ENGOs, chosen due to the organisations lack of capacity and credibility, but there are 
reasons to believe that they also ride the wave of social corporatism gaining a stronger 
foothold in the state-society relations in China.  
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7 Conclusion 
The threat of climate change is a political concern both inside and outside of China. The state 
is increasingly alarmed by what the consequences of climate change might lead to in China 
and is now trying to address the “three dimensional dilemma” through building a low carbon 
economy. The inclusion of the public is one of the strategies emphasised to reach this political 
target. The public, analysed through the work of societal actors in climate change concerned 
ENGOs, are highly involved in the matter. It is in their interest to combat the threat of climate 
change, inform and engage both state and society. Through the case study of two domestic 
ENGOs, CYCAN and C-CAN, their agendas have been analysed.  
The two organisations are non-profit organisations that target to reduce the threat of climate 
change, primarily domestically. C-CAN is an unregistered network organisation that 
collaborates closely with the officially registered organisation CANGO and the climate 
change department of the NDRC. C-CAN emphasises policy advocacy, climate change 
reduction campaigns in society, research support and collaboration between 16 domestic 
ENGOs in China. CYCAN is registered as a business and it puts emphasis on raising 
awareness amongst youth, climate change reduction campaigns at Universities, education and 
research support. CYCAN is a part of C-CANs network. The two organisations agendas differ 
in terms of whom they want to engage and reach. Obstacles the ENGOs’ agendas face are 
campaign funding and outreach, credibility in the state and society, language barriers and 
registration status in addition to battling the Chinese society’s low interest for climate change.  
To explore the ENGOs’ scope of action on the above mentioned climate change agendas and 
their relation to state actors, I have used corporatism as a theory in which this state-society 
interaction could be analysed. The two subtypes of corporatism: societal corporatism and state 
corporatism have been applied to discern and explore the interaction between the ENGOs and 
the state. When dealing with this theory, we see that there is both change and continuity in 
China’s state-society relations (Lu, 2009, p. 136). This thesis has shown that the continuation 
of the state corporate mechanisms, thus the clear limitations to establish fractions and agendas 
that threaten the state’s authority, is evident. Drawing on state corporatism the ENGOs are 
used as a method for the state to reach its targets, control the opposition and gain access to the 
societal actors ideas. 
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However, the societal change since the 1980s, has led to an increase in societal corporate 
mechanisms that interact with both the state and society. This is evident in combating the 
threat of climate change as well. The international climate change negotiations, the frequent 
use of online media and various financial donors gaining access to the Chinese market, have 
entered the climate change and NGO arena and are contributing to the growth of societal 
corporate mechanisms. The initial assumptions that the growing societal corporatist 
mechanisms in China have led to the ENGOs enjoying bigger political interaction possibilities 
have through the analysis been verified. The growth of societal corporate mechanisms affects 
the interaction between the state and society and the ENGOs’ agenda setting opportunities. 
However, the scope to act on the ENGOs’ agendas is not necessarily growing. This is seen in 
how the societal corporatist mechanisms still are under the influence of state control and 
furthermore, that fund raising shortage limits the organisations’ scope to act. 
This thesis has been exploring to what extent Chinese ENGOs are setting and pursuing their 
own agendas related to climate change mitigation and to what extent the Chinese state and 
other factors determine those agendas for them. In every state-society relation there exist 
tension between participation and discipline of actors. To decide what is determined by what 
or who is a complex task. However, throughout the analysis I have made some observations 
on the extent of independent and less independent agenda setting for the two ENGOs. Both 
CYCAN and C-CAN are to a large extent pursuing their own agendas. The organisations are 
conducting their work and campaigns based on their own interests; to combat climate change, 
network and raise awareness. However, the ENGOs’ agendas are not exceeding the national 
climate change policy targets and thereby not opposing the state. The question of to what 
extent the ENGOs are setting their own agenda arises. Due to the tight link CANGO and 
NDRC have with both C-CAN and its network organisations it is difficult to conclude on 
what premises their agendas are set. Both ENGOs concluded that demanding more climate 
change action domestically puts pressure on Chinas international negotiations and is therefore 
a sensitive topic for the ENGOs to be engaged in, as it points back to their less progressive 
agendas. However, through the analysis of the two ENGOs there are no clear remarks made 
on the ENGOs wanting to set other or more challenging agendas than they already have.   
Other factors that determine the ENGOs’ agendas are how the international climate change 
negotiations and the ENGOs’ joint targets are of support. Further we have seen how online 
media activity is an important and desired venue to set forth climate change agendas and 
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activity. In addition we have seen that, the consequence of reliance upon financial donors, 
which the ENGOs survival depends on, is on one hand making the pursuit of the ENGOs’ 
agendas possible. On the other hand, in this case study the withdrawal of funding is more 
threatening to the existence of the ENGOs than state intervention. 
The two ENGOs have in exchange for collaborating closely with an officially registered 
ENGO and NDRC presumably set less challenging agendas but are at the same time 
increasing their political interaction possibilities. The findings made on C-CANs position as a 
non-registered ENGO collaborating with the state challenges previous research on how the 
strict legislation procedures for ENGOs confines their work. It is an example that there are 
possibilities for non-registered entities outside the state to engage in state matters. Moreover, 
this collaboration and “invitation from the top” is also a clear sign of how the growing 
societal corporate mechanisms are gaining foothold in China. Since the threat of climate 
change is of high priority to the state there are reasons to believe that the role the ENGO’s 
play in Chinese society is timely and a good way to reach public awareness about a concern 
that will affect society in one way or the other. Since the state is openly cooperating with a 
non-registered entity, one would like to assume that the importance of battling climate change 
together with societal actors is stronger than enforcing legal procedures. However, there 
might be other reasons for this collaboration which information is opaque, such as financial 
motives.  
What would be interesting to revisit in future research is whether or not the extent of the 
ENGOs’ collaboration with the state will be less when the climate change storm is raging or 
when the societal actors are becoming too challenging. Will this be the situation for CYCAN 
and C-CAN or is climate change such a crucial topic in China that the state will continue the 
trend of including the work of the ENGOs in the future? The signs of a larger extent of 
societal corporate mechanisms give Chinese ENGOs political interaction possibilities. 
However, if one of the mechanisms, such as donor activity, ceases, it will threaten the 
agendas of the ENGOs to a large extent. To look into the dynamics and tension within the 
societal corporate mechanisms themselves and how this challenge the ENGOs will be an 
interesting and relevant point in a prolonged research on Chinese ENGOs’ scope to act on 
their interests. 
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Appendix 1 
Chinese names and expressions   
 
Chapter 2 
Hexie shehui-XrR0 
 
Chapter 4 
Beijing Guoan-TU#V 
Baipishu-stu 
Fei zhengfu zuzhi-v\w*+ 
Gonggong canyu-WXY5 
Jijinhui-xy0 
Minban feiqiye danwei-#$%&'() 
Minjian zuzhi-5)*+ 
Qunzhong tuanti-Z[=\ 
Renmin tuanti-(5z{ 
Shehui tuanti –BC=\ 
Shetuan-Rz 
Wangluo-,- 
Yewu zhuguan danwei-'*+,() 
 
Chapter 5 
CANGO-"##]$%34^_`aC -
CCAN-"#$%&'()*+,-  
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Gongzhong de renwei-W[6 
Green Anhui Environmental Development Centre-Vj{ufg"z 
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Appendix 2 
 
Figure 1  
Overview of the 11
th
 FYP and the 12
th
 FYP targets 
The 11
th
 FYP targets 
Initiative Target Outcome 
Energy intensity Reduce by 20% Reduced by 19,3% 
Carbon intensity 40-45% (by 2020) Fell by 1550 Mt CO2  
Non-fossil fuel Increase share of non-fossil fuels 
by 3,1% per year 
Increased by 8,3% 
 
The 12
th
 FYP targets 
Initiative Target  
Energy intensity Reduce by 16% 
Carbon intensity Reduce by 17% (40-45% by 2020) 
Non-fossil fuel Increase the share of non-fossil 
fuels by 3,1% so it accounts for 
11,4 % of China’s total energy 
consumption.  
 
Source: Moe, 2011, p.17 
 
The policy goal in the 11th FYP was to reduce the ratio of total energy consumption per unit 
of GDP by 20 per cent in 2010 compared to 2005 levels (Xinhua, 2006). In this period China 
came close to meeting its target, reducing energy intensity over the five-year period by 
19.1%, and increasing non-fossil fuel use by 3.1% per year, so that non-fossil energy today 
comprises 8.3% of China’s total energy use (Seligsohn, 2011, p.1). Even though emission 
reductions were addressed in this FYP, emission reductions were not linked to climate change 
mitigation that it is today. Some of the 12
th
 FYPs key targets on the environment and clean 
energy are that non-fossil fuel shall account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption; 
energy consumption per unit of GDP will be cut by 16%; carbon dioxide emission per unit of 
GDP will be cut by 17% (Xinhua, 2011a, Xinhua, 2011c). 
